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Chapter 1
Introduction
Beginning in the past century, the possibilities to collect and use
data of various kinds aggrandised dramatically. This development
war accompanied by an enormous growth in computational power.
The combination of both lead to a situation, where information is
not only used for a single purpose that it was initially collected for,
but also connected to various other information, reinterpreted and
perhaps used or abused for purposes nobody could imagine. With
the new possibilities of data usage, unfortunately there also arose
possibilities to abuse provided information. Especially it lead to a
huge loss in privacy.
Because of this development, it became insufficient to consider
only data that is directly stored in a database or a direct consequence
thereof. It is also necessary to protect against various other kinds of
situations. For one, answers of a database, e.g. containing communi-
cation information, can lead to possible harmful believes, e.g. when a
1
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potential employer knows about contacts to a lawyer or to a (known)
subject in a criminal case, this might raise suspicion and hence cause
an application to fail. It turns out that possible meta analyses of
controlled answers are even more problematic. Those can result in
situations, where agents that query a protected database utilizing
additional knowledge, e.g. the used method of data-protection, can
infer the information, that was supposedly hidden. However, since it
seems desirable to allow usage of not harmful information, the pro-
tection of knowledge should not lead to totally blocking all requests
for data. Moreover, the need to protect some information from being
revealed is often directly opposed by the need to be certain about
some related information. For instance in healthcare it is necessary
to have information about the spread of an infection and possible
infection zones, but not desirable to give away any identifying data
of infected people to avoid e.g. any harassment. Hence it is manda-
tory to simultaneously address both, the need to make as much safe
information public as possible and the protection from potentially
malicious usage of attainable data.
To cope with this newly recognized problem, in recent research
various approaches and methods were studied and developed. One of
the most successful variants in privacy protection are so called con-
trolled query evaluation mechanisms that were pioneered in [Bis00]
and [BW08]. The main idea is the following: The access-system of
a database is equipped with a so called censor. This censor acts
as a mediator between a querying agent and the database. There-
fore separating storing information and maintaining privacy. As
such, the censor has full access to the knowledge stored and im-
plied by the database. In order to ensure privacy, the censor has
2
the abilities to distort the result before answering the query. For
instance, it might chose to refuse ([SDJR83]) to answer or even to
lie ([BKS95]), i.e. give an answer not matching the stored informa-
tion. To maintain privacy in a consistent manner, even over multiple
queries and answers, it can also be equipped with a history of an-
swers or additional checking methods, other than plain database
evaluation. The framework for controlled query evaluation has been
applied for a variety of data models and control mechanisms, see for
instance [BB04a, BB04b, BB07, BW08].
Another aspect of data hoarding is the failure of the closed world
assumption, i.e. assuming not directly inferable information to be
false. It was replaced by the open world assumption, that distin-
guishes between knowledge, i.e. facts that the database can decide to
be either true of false, and unknowledge, i.e. statements that cannot
be decided, e.g. because of insufficient data: A database containing
climate information of the server-room does not know whether it
rains outside or not.
Hence, in systems with Boolean incomplete information, the def-
inition of the standard truth values slightly changes: The standard
values t (true) and f (false) have to be read as “known to be true”
and “known to be false” respectively. Additionally, a third truth
value u (unknown) has to be added to describe that the statement
can not be decided.
Goal of this thesis is to connect both, controlled query evalua-
tion and incomplete knowledge, in a very wide framework. To this
end, we adapt a specific approach for propositional logic presented in
[BW08] to incomplete databases defined on general semantics, sim-
ilar to the comparable approach in [Stu13]. Furthermore, we show
3
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that in case the underlying semantics has enough structure, data-
bases on this semantics can essentially be treated like a propositional
database.
Outline: In chapter 2 we explicitly state what is meant by the
concepts of “semantics” and “incomplete evaluation” in a formal
way. Also we introduce all basic notions and give an overview and
motivation to privacy related definitions.
In chapter 3 we present example semantics to serve three pur-
poses: Firstly, to allow comparison of the presented semantical def-
initions in widely known concrete realisations, secondly, to provide
a more concise motivation on structural properties of semantics and
lastly, to establish a general example setting against which all de-
fined censors of chapter 5 can be tested.
In the following chapter 4, we show simplifications of the general
semantic framework, that can be achieved in case the semantics is
equipped with structural properties (e.g. a negation operator or an
atomic base).
Finally, in chapter 5, we present censors, that work on all data-
bases with general semantics. Let us point out, that a specialized
version of the presented censors was presented in [SW14], in which
the presented examples can also be found.
4
Chapter 2
Definitions
2.1 Notations
In this section, we clarify how quite common notions are represented
within this work. This is mainly to avoid confusion with seemingly
common notations, that are introduced in the upcoming sections in
a more rigorous way. Since all introduced notations and concepts
are well known, we will only give an informal meaning.
Definition 2.1.1
A function from A to B, written f : A → B, is a mapping, that
assigns an element of B to each element of A. The set A is called
domain and B is called range. 2
Let us point out, that all functions used and defined in this work
are total, i.e. they are defined on their whole domain.
5
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The usual notations for set operations are used throughout the
whole text. In particular we use the following:
Definition 2.1.2
• ∅ the empty set, i.e. a set without any elements,
• {a ∈ A | P (a)} the set containing all elements of A, which
satisfy property P ,
• {f(b) | b ∈ B} the set containing the image of a function f
restricted to a set B,
• A ∩ B intersection of the sets A and B, and ⋂
i∈I
Ai describing
the (possibly infinite) intersection of some indexed sets,
• A ∪ B union of the sets A and B, and analogously ⋃
i∈I
Ai de-
scribing the (possibly infinite) union of some indexed sets,
• A \B complement of B in A,
• A×B the Cartesian product of A and B. 2
In order to keep notational overhead due to bookkeeping to a
minimum, we use two special sets to denote natural numbers. Of
which one contains the element 0 and the other does not.
Definition 2.1.3
The set of natural numbers is defined as N0 := {0, 1, 2, . . .} and the
set of nonzero natural numbers as N := {1, 2, 3, . . .}. 2
Let us already point out, that in most cases –like the upcoming defi-
nition of sequences– the positive natural numbers N is used as index
set. This allows to encode initial states with the special index 0,
removing extra treatments of those cases.
6
2.1. NOTATIONS
Definition 2.1.4 (tuples/sequences)
A tuple on a set V of length n = #v¯ is a function v¯ : {1, . . . n} → S,
they are represented in the usual tuple notation v¯ = (v1, . . . , vn).
Likewise a sequence on a set S is a function s : N→ S. Sequences are
represented in the usual way, either as compact notation s = (si)i∈N
or as “infinite tuple” s = (s1, s2, . . .). 2
Definition 2.1.5
• Two tuples v¯, w¯ are identical, iff they have the same length, i.e.
#v¯ = #w¯ and all their components are identical, i.e. si = ti
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ #v¯.
• Analogously two sequences s and t are equal, written s = t,
iff their components agree, i.e. si = ti for all i ∈ N.
• A sequence s = (si)i∈N has the finite restriction
s|n = (s1, . . . , sn)
to a tuple of length n. 2
Definition 2.1.6
A partition (P1, . . . Pn) of a set S is tuple of disjoint subsets of S,
dividing all members of the set in the members of the collection, i.e.⋃
i∈I
Pi = S and Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for all i ∈ I (Pi ⊆ S already follows).
2
Finally, to ease up several tedious inductive definitions, we make
use of a tool used in theoretical computer science to formally specify
context-free languages. Details of this notation can be found e.g. in
[BBG+63] and [Sch08]
7
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Definition 2.1.7 (Backus–Naur form)
For two sets T (terminals) and N (non-terminals), a grammar is a
collection of rules that have the form
n ::= s1 . . . sn,
where n ∈ N and si ∈ T ∪N for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The rule means, that the non-terminal n can be substituted by the
string s1 . . . sn, which might contain more non-terminals. The lan-
guage L derived from a starting symbol s ∈ N is the set of all strings
of terminals, that can be derived from s by successively substituting
all occurrences of nonterminals according to the given rules.
Notice, that there might be multiple rules for each non-terminal.
Hence, to ease notation further, we adapt two common abbrevia-
tions that allow collecting rules for the same non-terminal into the
same line:
Firstly we use the symbol “ | ” to split several derivable strings and
secondly we use “ a |
a∈A
” to add a derivation to each a ∈ A ⊆ T . 2
2.2 Semantics
One of the main tools we use is (generalised) semantics. In common
use a semantics is applied to attach a meaning to a language. When
dealing with controlled query evaluation however, it turns out, that
in most cases the structure of the language is irrelevant. This is
due to the fact, that most queries can be handled by only looking
at the model class of the queried formula. Hence, we separate the
structured parts, that mainly restrict the language with respect to
its satisfaction symbol.
8
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2.2.1 Generalized Semantics
As already stated, semantics in one of its most general forms is used:
Definition 2.2.1 (Semantics)
A semantics is a triple (L, I, ), consisting of
• a language L (i.e. a non-empty set of strings on an alphabet),
• a class of interpretations I (models) for that language and
• a satisfaction relation  ⊆ I × L.
An element of the language is also called a formula. A formula
ϕ ∈ L is satisfied in an interpretation i ∈ I, iff (i, ϕ) ∈  . As usual
the standard notation i  ϕ is used, when a formula is satisfied,
and i 6 ϕ, when it is not. 2
Throughout this work, only non-trivial semantics are discussed, i.e.
the language, the class of interpretations and the satisfaction relation
are non-empty (as sets).
There are two helpful addenda to the definition of satisfaction,
to help in dealing with multiple formulae. The first is to allow sets
of formulae on the right hand side, meaning that all of the contained
formulae must be satisfied or unsatisfied simultaneously:
Definition 2.2.2
For C ⊆ L and i ∈ I
• i  C means that i  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ C, and
• i co C means that i 6 ϕ for all ϕ ∈ C.
C is called satisfiable, iff there is an interpretation i ∈ I, s.t. i  C.2
9
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The second tool is allowing sets of formulae on the left hand side,
too, in order to deal simultaneously with all interpretations that
satisfy or dissatisfy exactly all formulae contained in the specified
sets.
To ease notation, the formulae that must be satisfied and those
that must be dissatisfied can be handled as a bundle.
Definition 2.2.3 (Knowledge-Base)
A Knowledge-base on a semantics S = (L, I, ) is a pair
KK = (TKK ,FKK ), where
1. TKK ⊆ L is the set of stored positive knowledge (or known true
formulae).
2. FKK ⊆ L is the set of stored negative knowledge (or known
false formulae).
A knowledge-base is called purely positive [purely negative], iff no
negative [positive] knowledge is stored, i.e. FKK = ∅ [TKK = ∅].
It is called satisfiable or consistent , iff there is an interpretation i ∈ I,
s.t. i  TKK and i 
co FKK . In this case, i is called interpretation of
the knowledge-base, written i  KK. 2
Definition 2.2.4 (Semantical Implication)
Given a fixed semantics (L, I, ) and sets of formulae T,F,R ⊆ L,
we define:
• T,F semantically imply R, written T,F  R, iff
{i ∈ I | i  T} ∩ {i ∈ I | i co F} ⊆ {i ∈ I | i  R}
i.e. all interpretations which satisfy all formulae in T, but none
of F, also satisfy all formulae in F.
10
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• T,F semantically co-imply R, written T,F co R, iff
∅ 6= {i ∈ I | i  T} ∩ {i ∈ I | i co F} ⊆ {i ∈ I | i co R}
i.e. none of the interpretations, satisfying all formulae in T,
but none in F, satisfies any formula of R.
• for two knowledge-bases (T0 ,F0 ) , (T1 ,F1 ), semantical implica-
tion T0 ,F0  T1 ,F1 is given by
{i ∈ I | i  (T0 ,F0 )} ⊆ {i ∈ I | i  (T1 ,F1 )}}
which is equivalent to
{i ∈ I | i  T0 } ∩ {i ∈ I | i co F0 }
⊆ {i ∈ I | i  T1 } ∩ {i ∈ I | i co F1} 2
In the definition above the set T acts as set of positive knowledge,
containing all facts known to be true. The contrasting set F acts
as negative knowledge, containing all facts known to be false. For
the sake of simplification, set brackets on the right side can be al-
ways omitted. The set brackets on the left are necessary to distinct
between positive and negative knowledge. However, in case the set
of negative knowledge F is empty, the set or its brackets may be
omitted.
Lemma 2.2.5
For T,F ⊆ L, the pair (T,F) is satisfiable, iff
T,F co ∅
2
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Proof It holds {i ∈ I | i co ∅} = I. Hence, any i ∈ I, s.t. i  T
and i co F will witness ∅ 6= {i ∈ I | i  T} ∩ {i ∈ I | i co F}.
The other direction follows by reversing the argument. 
Remark 2.2.6
In the definition of semantical co-implication the set of interpreta-
tions of T violating (i.e. do not satisfy) all formulae in F may not
be empty. This is mainly a technical trick, to achieve simpler defi-
nitions of the database-evaluators.
Also the notion of being a semantical co-implication is stronger than
just not being a semantical implication: T,F 6 R only means, that
there is an interpretation i ∈ I, s.t. i  T and i co F, but i 6 R.
However, it allows interpretations to exist, where this does not hold,
i.e. there still can be j ∈ I, s.t. j  T, j co F and j  R. Semantic
co-implication forbids this existence. Furthermore, it requires that
especially T has at least one interpretation.
Hence, the symbols 6 and co should not be misinterpreted (likewise
the symbols  and 6co ). 2
Definition 2.2.7
The set of tautologies TS (always true formulae) and the set of un-
satisfiables FS (always false formulae) are defined by
TS := {ϕ ∈ L | for all i ∈ I i  ϕ}
FS := {ϕ ∈ L | for all i ∈ I i 6 ϕ} 2
12
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2.2.2 Structural properties
In some cases it does matter, if a language has special properties.
Mainly it concerns the possession of operators on the language, that
allow the language to internalise some of the properties of the sat-
isfaction relation. In some settings, those operators allow a sim-
plification of the censoring systems presented in chapter 5, namely
if negation is internalised into the language. In other cases, e.g. if
the language is atomic, they can cause problems if some additional
knowledge is introduced to the setting as well.
Definition 2.2.8 (Subboolean language)
A language L is called subboolean, iff there are
• a non-empty, finite set of operators O on L,
i.e. o ∈ O is a function o : Ldeg(o) → L for some deg(o) ∈ N,
• and a basis B ⊆ L, i.e. for all o ∈ O and ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o) ∈ B
o(ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o)) 6∈ B
s.t. L = ⋃
i∈N0
Ln, where Ln is inductively defined by
• L0 := B and
• Ln+1 := Ln ∪
⋃
o∈O
{o(ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o)) | ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o) ∈ Ln}.
The formulae contained in B are called base formulae and the for-
mulae in L \B are called compound formulae of L. 2
13
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Definition 2.2.9
A semantics (L, I, ) is called subboolean, iff its language is sub-
boolean and the satisfaction of compound formulae can be induc-
tively calculated from the base formulae and Boolean functions as-
signed to the operators. I.e.
• for each operator o ∈ O there is a Boolean function
bo : {0, 1}deg(o) → {0, 1},
• to each interpretation i ∈ I and formula ψ ∈ L there are values
viψ ∈ {0, 1}, s.t. viψ = 1 iff i  ψ and viψ = 0 iff i 6 ψ,
• and the values viψ can be obtained by
– if ψ ∈ B = L0,
then viψ = 1 iff i  ψ and viψ = 0 iff i 6 ψ
– if ψ = o(ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o)) ∈ Ln+1 \ Ln,
then viψ = bo(v
i
ψ1
, . . . , viψdeg(o)). 2
14
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Definition 2.2.10 (Atomicity)
A subboolean semantics (L, I, ) is called atomic, iff the sets of
interpretations of sets of basic formulae are independent.
I.e. for all C1, C2 ⊆ B the conditions
• C1, C2 are semantic separable, i.e.
{i ∈ I | i  C1} 6= {i ∈ I | i co C2}
• and C1, C2 are semantic inclusive, i.e.
C1 ⊆ C2 iff C2  C1
hold. 2
Remark 2.2.11
One immediate property of atomicity is, that no basic formula ψ ∈ B
can be a tautology or unsatisfiable. Otherwise, either
{i ∈ I | i  {ψ}} 6= {i ∈ I | i co ∅}
or {i ∈ I | i  ∅} 6= {i ∈ I | i co {ψ}}
would be violated.
It is also worth noticing, that from the definition follows
{i ∈ I | i  C1} = {i ∈ I | i  C2} iff C1 = C2
as well, for all C1, C2 ⊆ B. 2
Example 2.2.12
As simple example consider the semantics (L, I, ), with
• L := {a, b}?
= {ε, a, b, aa, ab, ba, bb, aaa, aab, aba, aab, abb, bbb, . . .}
15
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• I := {k, j} and
•  := {(k, a), (j, b)} ∪ {(k, w), (j, w) | w ∈ L \ {a, b, ε}}.
This semantics is subboolean with base formulae B := {ε, a, b} and
a single operator concat(ψ1, ψ2) = ψ1ψ2 and bconcat = max(v1, v2).
However, since
{i ∈ I | i  {a}} = {i ∈ I | i co {b}} = {k}
holds, it is not atomic (or alternatively, because ε ∈ B is unsatisfi-
able and remark 2.2.11). 2
Definition 2.2.13
A knowledge-base KK = (T,F) on an atomic semantics is called
atomic, iff T,F ⊆ B. 2
A semantics defines truth and falsity for any formula based on
the model it is interpreted on. On most common languages exists
a special unary negation operator. The corresponding semantics
internalize this operator by interchanging this truth and falsity of a
formula within a model into the language.
Definition 2.2.14 (negation operator)
A semantics (L, I, ) has a negation operator ¬, iff
• L is closed under ¬, i.e. ϕ ∈ L iff ¬ϕ ∈ L.
• and for each ϕ ∈ L and i ∈ I, it holds i  ϕ iff i 6 ¬ϕ. 2
It is worth noticing, that ¬ might not be an explicit symbol of the
language. In view of the given definition, it could also be a complex
transformation of the formula, e.g. ¬(ϕ) = ϕ→ ⊥ in sequential style
propositional logics.
16
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Remark 2.2.15
The converse of the second negation property, for each ϕ ∈ L
and i ∈ I it is
i  ¬ϕ iff i 6 ϕ,
also holds:
Otherwise either both, i  ¬ϕ and i  ϕ, violating the resulting
i 6 ¬ϕ, or both, i 6 ¬ϕ and i 6 ϕ, violating i  ϕ, would hold. 2
Example 2.2.16 (2.2.12 cont’d)
There is a way to modify the presented into an atomic version. One
can add a second operator to the set of operators, particularly a
negation defined element-wise by
¬ε = ab
¬a = b
¬b = a
¬w = ε
for all w ∈ L \ {ε, a, b}. Seeing that this is a negation is a straight
forward check of satisfaction in the two interpretations:
k  a and k 6 ¬a
k  w and k 6 ¬w
j  b and j 6 ¬b
j  w and j 6 ¬w
Obviously, the Boolean function b¬(v) := 1 − v can be assigned to
the negation operator. Together with the operator concat a possible
17
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choice of base formulae isB := {a}, which is trivially atomic. Notice,
that ε = ¬(concat(¬(a), a)) is not an element of the basis anymore,
but can be expressed in terms of the basis and the operators as
presented. 2
2.3 Incomplete Evaluation
The second main tool is incomplete evaluation. The incomplete
evaluator qualifies, to what extend a formula is known within a
knowledge-base. An evaluated formula that is known, i.e. is either
semantically implied or co-implied, can be evaluated to t (known
to be true) or f (known to be false). But also a third option is
possible, namely that the formula is not known. This is denoted by
an evaluation u (unknown).
Definition 2.3.1 (Incomplete Evaluator)
Let (L, I, ) be a semantics. The full incomplete evaluator eval(·)
on this semantics is defined by:
eval :

℘ (L)× ℘ (L)× L → {t, f, u}
(T,F, ϕ) 7→

t if T,F  ϕ
f if T,F co ϕ
u else
The positive incomplete evaluator eval(·) on this semantics is defined
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by
eval :

℘ (L)× L → {t, f, u}
(T, ϕ) 7→

t if T, ∅  ϕ
f if T, ∅ co ϕ
u else
with a different signature.
For any given knowledge-base (T,F). the short-notation eval(T,F) is
declared by
eval(T,F)(ϕ) = eval(T,F, ϕ)
and evalT is declared by
evalT(ϕ) = eval(T, ϕ) = eval(T, ∅, ϕ) 2
Both definitions of eval are highly dependent on the underly-
ing semantics. Thus, in case changing semantics are observed, one
should add the currently used semantics into its signature. How-
ever, since in this work the actually used semantics is fixed in most
situations, it is omitted in favour of readability.
Remark 2.3.2
As is easily seen, for any C ⊆ L evalC is a function: a formula ϕ ∈ L
is evaluated to t, iff all interpretations i ∈ I of C ( i  C ) are also
interpretations of ϕ (i  ϕ). It is evaluated to f , iff none of them is
an interpretation of ϕ (i 6 ϕ).
Especially ϕ is evaluated to u, iff there are interpretations i, k ∈ I,
s.t. i  C and k  C, but i  ϕ and k 6 ϕ. 2
19
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
2.4 Censors for Databases
2.4.1 Databases
There are several different approaches to querying databases. A
well-known possibility are databases for so-called retrieval queries,
i.e. queries that formalize a predicate and databases returning a list
of elements which satisfy this predicate.
Another approach is to consider Boolean queries, i.e. queries for-
malizing questions that can be answered with true (t) or false (f).
Of course, since almost no knowledge-base is omniscient, there are
questions that the database cannot decide by means of its stored
(and supposedly true) information.
In this work we study the three-valued approach in a general
framework and show how to apply it in the context of a database con-
taining (incomplete) information. That means the decision whether
a formula is evaluated to true, false or unknown is based on incom-
plete evaluation.
A general database, which is capable of answering true, false or
unknown, can by formalized as follows:
Definition 2.4.1 (Boolean Database)
An (incomplete, generalized) Boolean database D = (SD, TD ,FD ) is a
semantics SD, together with a knowledge-base (TD ,FD ) on SD.
A Boolean database is called complete iff u is not in the range
of eval(TD ,FD ).
A Boolean database E is a sub-database of D, iff SD = SE and
TD ,FD  TE ,FE . 2
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General Boolean databases are only useful, if the underlying se-
mantics is subject to change. Most times in this work, the semantics
will be fixed throughout every chapter.
Remark 2.4.2
In semantics with a negation operator it is sufficient to store only the
positive knowledge. This is simply done by adding negated versions
of the false formulae to the set of positive knowledge. Also, it suffices
to consider the positive evaluator only in this setting. In essence, in
any logic with negation operator, all databases can be treated to be
purely positive (or purely negative). 2
There are mainly two ways to query a Boolean database: An
agent can ask a formula of the database’s semantics, then receive
the result and maybe follow up to continue asking, or the agent can
ask several queries at once and get a mapping of the query-set to
the results.
However, since there is always an order in which the evaluation
has to happen, the second way reduces to the first as well.
Definition 2.4.3 (Queries and Results)
• A query on a Boolean database D is a formula in the language
of the database q ∈ LD. It has the result r = eval(TD ,FD )(q).
• A query-sequence on a Boolean database D is a sequence
q = (qi)i∈N ∈ LN.
It has the result-sequence r = (eval(TD ,FD )(qi))i∈N. 2
Query sequences are particularly useful. They provide a hand-
some tool to simulate answering a stream of queries without the
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need to define an independent log. However, at a first glance they
appear a bit counter-intuitive, since a guarding algorithm—having
access to the modelled full stream of querryies—could “look into the
future” and choose its answers dependent on this divination. To
cope with this, we will introduce the quality-property of continuity
(definition 2.4.19), that restricts an answer determination to past
information.
2.4.2 Censors
When talking about privacy, we need to specify not only what is to
be kept secret, but also which means can be used to achieve it. We
make use of three knowledge-bases, namely
• the (incomplete) knowledge-base CK (Censored Knowledge) con-
cealed behind the censor,
• the a priori-knowledge AK (Attacker’s Knowledge) describ-
ing the (incomplete and restricted) knowledge of the attacker
(which, in this work, is shared with the censor), and
• the (not necessarily satisfiable) secrets SK (Secret Knowledge)
containing protected formulae.
Here we mean by protected that after any sequence of queries none
of the formulae contained in SK may be revealed to the attacker. For
the sake of simplicity we will assume that the attacker believes at
the beginning only in true statements, i.e. we will assume CK |= AK.
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Definition 2.4.4 (Privacy Configuration)
A privacy configuration on a semantics S = (L, I, ) is a triple
PC = (CK,AK,SK),
where CK (Censored Knowledge), AK (Attacker’s Knowledge) and
SK = (TSK ,FSK ) (Secret Knowledge, divided in positive and negative
secrets) are knowledge-bases on S, s.t.
PC-A) CK  AK (Truthful Start).
PC-B) CK is satisfiable (Consistency).
PC-C) AK 6 σ for all σ ∈ TSK and AK 6
co
σ for all σ ∈ FSK
(Hidden Secrets). 2
Notably, the secret knowledge SK does not need to be satisfiable.
Moreover, it can even be very unsatisfiable, i.e. it contains formulae
that are not simultaneously satisfiable, or even have the same set of
formulae as positive and negative secrets, i.e. TSK = FSK .
Remark 2.4.5
As a consequence of 2.4.4, the (supposed) pre-knowledge of the
querying agent AK is satisfiable as well:
Either as a direct consequence of PC-C) by the definition of co , or
by combining the properties PC-A) and PC-B), since an interpreta-
tion of CK is also one for AK. 2
To achieve protection of the secret formulae, it is obviously neces-
sary to disallow a querying agent to directly access the database, i.e.
the database’s evaluator. Moreover, one might want to add the pos-
sibility of returning an answer differing from the full truth, but might
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stay “close to” it. In particular, we want a mechanism that responds
to a querying agent in such a way, that after any sequence of queries
all secrets remain safely hidden. To this end, we add a new func-
tion, called censor to the database, that acts as mediator between a
querying agent and the full stored information. As stated before, the
censor also needs to see what the querying agent has as its a priori
knowledge. Hence, it not only can make use of the query-sequence
and access to the evaluation function of the database, but also sees
the contextual information stored in the privacy-configuration.
Definition 2.4.6 (Censor)
A censor for a semantics S is a mapping that assigns an answering
function
censorPC : LN → AN
to each given privacy configuration PC = (CK,AK,SK) on S.
The set A contains the potential answers a censor might give.
Given a query-sequence q ∈ LN, the sequence
a = censorPC(q) = (ai)i∈N ∈ AN
is called answer-sequence of censor given PC. 2
Typically, only {t, f, u, r} and {t, f, u} are choices for A.
This coincides with the structure of the result-sequences. The first
variant just adds a special symbol r (refusal) to the set of possible
outcomes, to provide a syntactical representation of refusing to give
any answer.
So far a censor can randomly answer and does not provide any
safety.
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Example 2.4.7 (Evaluation Censors)
A trivial censor is the revealing evaluation censor that assigns the
actual answer to each query:
censor(CK,AK,SK)(q) = (eval(CK, qi))i∈N
A better, but also not very convenient censor is the overprotective
evaluation censor given by
censor(CK,AK,SK)(q) = (eval(AK, qi))i∈N
that tells the attacker only answers that it could calculate itself. 2
Clearly, neither the trivial nor the overprotective censor is of any
use. However, to introduce quality properties of censors, we will
have to define several additional helper structures.
2.4.3 Logging and Handling Facilities: Clouds
To effectively decide what answer should be chosen next by a censor,
it is necessary to reflect not only the current view presented to a
querying agent, but also keep track of the change of that views. Since
an attacker is often enough quite aware that a database is censored,
the information how the censor tries to change the attacker’s believe,
might be used to gain knowledge of an actually stored secret. Hence,
in this section we introduce tools to model the believe of the querying
agent after every stage of answering. To achieve this, we build up
a meta-semantics called cloud and introduce a translation of truth
meanings from given answers into the newly built up language.
Throughout this section, we fix a semantics S = (L, I, ).
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Definition 2.4.8 (Cloud Formulae)
A cloud-formula is a formula of L, prefixed by exactly one of the
symbols , , ♦ or . Hence, the set of cloud-formulae over L is
given by
CL := {ψ,ψ,♦ψ,ψ | ψ ∈ L}
2
Definition 2.4.9 (Cloud)
A (S-) cloud is a pair C = (WC, ιC), where
• WC is a nonempty set of worlds (names of interpretations) and
• ιC : WC → I is a function, i.e. for each w ∈ WC, ιC(w) ∈ I is
an interpretation. 2
Introducing ιC is actually unnecessary in this work, since it would
suffice to store a set of interpretations directly. However, some proofs
turn out to be more simple, when multiple names for the same in-
terpretation can be used to keep track of different properties of that
interpretation.
Clouds on a semantics, so far consisting of the shown prefixed
formulae as cloud-language and a set of cloud-interpretations, essen-
tially consisting of subsets of the preliminary interpretations, build—
of course—another semantics. The satisfaction-relation for the cloud
formulae is built up by modifying the underlying relation as follows:
Definition 2.4.10 (CL-satisfiability)
Satisfiability of a formula Φ ∈ CL within a S-cloud C = (WC, ιC) is
given in the following way:
• C  ψ iff for all w ∈WC it is ιC(w)  ψ
• C  ψ iff for all w ∈WC it is ιC(w) 6 ψ
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• C  ♦ψ iff there is a w ∈WC, s.t. ιC(w)  ψ
• C  ψ iff there is a w ∈WC, s.t. ιC(w) 6 ψ
A formula Φ is valid iff it is satisfied in all S-clouds. 2
All notions of semantic implication defined in section 2.2 are ex-
tended to the thus newly built semantics. Especially, we make use
of (cloud-) satisfaction of sets of cloud-formulae and semantic impli-
cation and co-implication of sets of formulae.
To provide a translation of a query’s answer value to the new
logging structure, we introduce a function, that assigns to each such
pair an intended content.
Definition 2.4.11 (Content)
Let ψ ∈ L and a ∈ {t, f, u, r}. The (intended) content of a as answer
to ψ is given by
Cont(ψ, a) =

{ψ} if a = t
{ψ} if a = f
{♦ψ,ψ} if a = u
∅ if a = r
2
Remark 2.4.12
In case L is viewed in context of a semantics with a negation oper-
ator, the definition can be simplified to
Cont(ψ, a) =

{ψ} if a = t
{¬ψ} if a = f
{♦ψ,♦¬ψ} if a = u
∅ if a = r
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So in fact, negative knowledge, denying a formula, is being trans-
formed to positive knowledge, enforcing a negated formula. 2
As already stated, meta inferences make dealing with contents
more difficult. In chapter 5 we present situations, where a given an-
swer changes the view of a querying agent in a harmful way. Specif-
ically, it becomes able to infer actually stored values of queries, de-
spite the fact, that a different value was given as answer. Hence, in
order to keep track of the intended believe at each stage of answer-
ing (and hence also its change), we introduce a censor’s state cloud,
that strongly depends on the context where it is build up.
Definition 2.4.13 (StateCloud)
On a fixed Boolean database D, let censor be a censor
and PC = (CK,AK,SK) be a privacy configuration.
We define the state cloud wrt. a query-sequence q ∈ LN at stage n
by
SCPC,q(n) :=
⋃
ϕ∈AK
Cont(ϕ, t) ∪
n⋃
i=1
Cont(qi, ai),
where a := censor(CK,AK,SK)(q). 2
Notice, that state clouds depend heavily on all available con-
text information, i.e. privacy configuration, query sequence and the
calculated answer-sequence.
2.4.4 Privacy: The Qualities of a Censor
There are two levels at which the quality of a censor can be measured.
The first level involves the answers directly returned by the censor.
28
2.4. CENSORS FOR DATABASES
Since they provide a believe to any querying agent, they should be—
to some extend—believable, that is consistent. Also the provided
believe should not give away any secret. Otherwise, the censor would
appear useless.
On a second level, a censor should also fulfil more indirect con-
cerns. To start with, it should stay as close to “the truth” as possible.
This means, it should provide as much actually stored information to
a querying agent as possible. Another concern is what happens if the
used algorithm is known to the attacker. This would induce, that the
attacker might be able to reverse engineer the decision process the
censor went through, possibly revealing a conditional necessity that
leaks a secret. Lastly, since the query-sequences we use are only
meant as a technical tool, answers should not depend on queries,
that will happen in the future.
Immediate Qualities
To formalize the first level of qualities, that the directly provided
believe system should have, in this section we introduce two quality
terms: Credibility and Effectiveness.
Credibility means, that the provided information is consistent at
any given point.
Definition 2.4.14 (Credible)
A censor censor is called credible for PC, iff for every sequence q ∈ LN
and every n ∈ N, it holds
SCPC,q(n) is satisfiable
(
CnPC,q
)
It is called credible, iff it is credible for all privacy-configurations.2
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It is immediately clear, that a censor should not directly or al-
most directly give away the secrets. I.e. effectiveness is given, if any
provided view does not imply the knowledge of any secret.
Definition 2.4.15 (Effective)
A censor censor is called effective for PC = (CK,AK, (TSK ,FSK )), iff
for all sequences q ∈ LN and every n ∈ N it holds
SCPC,q(n) 6 σ for every σ ∈ TSK
(
EnPC,q
)
and
SCPC,q(n) 6 σ for every σ ∈ FSK
(
E¯nPC,q
)
(i.e. no secret is semantically implied by a state cloud).
It is called effective, iff it is effective for all privacy-configurations.2
For technical reasons, mainly to allow inductive proofs, we also
introduce a notion of stages. That is, the required properties of
effectiveness and credibility are held for all answers up to a given
point in the query-sequence.
Definition 2.4.16 (Stages)
A censor censor is called credible [effective] for PC up to stage k ∈ N,
iff the condition
(
CnPC,q
)
[
(
EnPC,q
)
and
(
E¯nPC,q
)
], is satisfied for all
n ≤ k.
A censor is called credible [effective] up to stage k ∈ N, if it is for all
privacy-configurations. 2
Example 2.4.17
The revealing evaluation censor from example 2.4.7 is credible, but
not effective. The overprotective evaluation censor is effective and
credible. The censor given by
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censorPC(CK,AK,SK)(q) =
{
(f)i∈N if SK = (∅, ∅)
(evalAK(qi))i∈N else
is effective, but not credible. Effectiveness follows in the “else”-
case by the definition of PC, which implies evalAK(σ) ∈ {f, u} for all
secrets σ ∈ TSK and evalAK(σ) ∈ {t, u} for all secrets σ ∈ FSK . If
there are no secrets this fact is trivial.
However the censor is not credible, since it will answer f to a query
on a tautology or formula from TAK in any privacy configuration with
an empty set of secrets. 2
Effective but not credible censors are, however, not very com-
mon. The presented censor for example is credible for all privacy
configurations that protect at least one secret. Furthermore in the
above construction one can mainly change the answering function in
case no secrets are to be protected and change to a different effec-
tive and credible censor in case there is something to be kept secret.
This is due to the fact that, if the censors’ answers lead to an un-
satisfiable state cloud at stage n, for any positive [negative] secret
σ (in fact for any formula σ ∈ L) it would follow SCPC,q(n) |= σ
[SCPC,q(n) |= σ] immediately, violating the property of effective-
ness. To summarize this:
Lemma 2.4.18
Let PC be a privacy configuration, s.t. SK 6= (∅, ∅). Then every censor
that is effective for PC is also credible for PC. 2
Meta Qualities
There are some properties one might deem useful or desirable for a
censor. Those consist of properties, that restrict the censor in the
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choice of answers or add safety on a not immediate level. In this
section, we introduce for the first category the notions continuity,
truthful and its negation lying together with the variant cooperation,
and minimal invasion. For the second kind, we introduce the term
of repudiation and its more restricted atomic version.
Continuity is more a technical necessity, then a privacy condition.
The definition of continuity is the usual term, that is also used in the
standard sequence topology, where sets of sequences with identical
initial sequences act as basis of the open sets.
Definition 2.4.19 (Continuous)
A censor censor is called continuous for a privacy-configuration PC,
iff for all sequences q, r ∈ LN and all n ∈ N, it is
q|n = r|n → censor(q)|n = censor(r)|n ,
where a|n denotes the initial segment of a of length n, i.e. (a1, . . . , an).
The censor is called continuous, iff it is continuous for all privacy-
configurations. 2
A censor being truthful translates to the requirement, that the censor
should not make any querying agent believe something false.
Definition 2.4.20 (Truthful)
The censor censor is called truthful, iff for all privacy configura-
tions PC, for all question sequences q and for all i:
ai ∈ {r, evalCK(qi)} ,
where a := censorPC(q).
A censor that is not truthful is called lying. 2
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Minimal invasion means that the censor should only hide an-
swers, that are directly harmful, i.e. answers leading to an inconsis-
tent view or a view that implies a secret.
Definition 2.4.21 (Minimal Invasion)
Let the censor censorPC be effective and credible for PC.
It is called minimally invasive for PC, iff whenever ai 6= evalCK(qi)
replacing ai by evalCK(qi) would lead to a violation of either effec-
tiveness or credibility. A censor is called minimally invasive, iff it is
minimally invasive for all privacy-configurations. 2
It might seem useful, that a censor should always honour a re-
quest for information, i.e. return an answer that is actually a possible
evaluation. Although, this translates to either giving up on hiding
information, and hence the intent of censoring, or to lie and not
refuse whenever necessary. Obviously, in this work we make use of
the second option.
Definition 2.4.22 (Cooperation)
A censor censorPC is called cooperative in a privacy configuration
PC = (CK,AK,SK), iff for all query-sequences q and indices i ∈ N
r 6= censorPC(q)i
I.e. r is not a possible answer for censorPC 2
In view of the fact that no algorithm can be hidden forever, an
additional goal is to ensure that a continuous censor should provide
unrevealing answers even if the method of determination is revealed
and the attacker even knows the potential secrets. The condition of
repudiation intuitively reads that there is a knowledge-base in which
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all secrets are (simultaneously) not stored (directly or indirectly)
and, supplied to a censor, would produce the same answers as the
original. Notice that this definition provides a version of plausible
deniability to all secrets, depending on the query sequence.
Definition 2.4.23 (Repudiation)
A censor censorPC is called repudiating, iff for each privacy configu-
ration (CK,AK,SK) and each query sequence q there are alternative
knowledge-bases RKi, s.t.
R-A) for all n ∈ N
censor(CK,AK,SK)(q)|n = censor(RKn,AK,SK)(q)|n,
R-B) for all n ∈ N and all σ ∈ TSK : RKn 6 σ, and
for all n ∈ N and all σ ∈ FSK : RKn 6
co
σ,
R-C) for all n ∈ N (RKn,AK,SK) is a privacy configuration.
If in addition censor is defined on an atomic semantics, it is called
atomic repudiating, iff. the knowledge-bases RKn are atomic, too. 2
Remark 2.4.24
The presented definition of (non atomic) repudiation works very well
to protect the data in the general semantics. However, in case an
attacker knows enough of the structure of the protected CK –e.g. if
CK is atomic–, it turns out to be insufficient. 2
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Example Semantics
3.1 Propositional Logic
Propositional logic is the most basic case for treating information.
In various settings that deal with propositional data the following
formalization is used: mostly all data that somehow can be called
basic are modeled as propositional atoms. Then, making use of this
basic structure, more complex formulae are evaluated.
Usually a (incomplete) propositional knowledge-base consists of
these atoms and stores the information whether they are true or
false, implicitly storing the rest as unknown. A knowledge-base of
this kind, i.e. one that stores only atomic propositions and their
truth values, is immediately atomic in the meaning given by def-
inition 2.2.13. The evaluation of a complex formula depends on
whether all assignments of the unknown atoms to true and false re-
sult in the same truth value for the complex formula. Consider, for
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instance, the formula p ∧ q. If p is unknown and q is false, then
p∧ q will be evaluated to false since in both cases—p is true and p is
false—the formula p ∧ q will have the truth value false. However, if
p is unknown and q is true, then the formula p∧ q will be evaluated
to unknown since there is an assignment of p that makes p ∧ q true
and there is another assignment of p that makes p ∧ q false.
In this work and especially with the censors in chapter 5, mostly
general knowledge-bases are discussed, namely such that can store
more complex formulae.
A careful examination of the literature on data privacy for propo-
sitional databases [BB04a, BB04b, BB07, BW08, BKS95, SDJR83]
reveals that almost always only atomic databases are considered to
settle the data privacy question.
This leads to several interesting questions.
1. Is the generalization from storing atomic to storing complex
facts really necessary?
2. To what extent can the storage of facts be reduced / simplified?
3. Is it necessary for an attacking agent to know the atoms that
are actually used in the knowledge-base?
In chapter 4 we will address the first two questions in an even
more general context: With respect to the first question, it turns out
that for each propositional knowledge-base, there exists a pseudo-
atomic database and a translation such that the answer evaluation
of a given query over the knowledge-base equals the evaluation of
the translated query over the pseudo-atomic knowledge-base. This
is established by showing that all query evaluations over a general
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database can be done via an evaluation function that only knows the
truth values of certain base formulae. Hence these base formulae can
then be translated to atomic formulae, which can be stored in an
atomic database.
Furthermore, we establish that these sets of base formulae are
minimal, which answers the first two questions partially: For propo-
sitional knowledge-bases it is always possible to store either the pos-
itive or the negative part as only atoms.
It also shows how switching to the atomic knowledge-bases sim-
plifies query evaluation.
Since pseudo-atomic knowledge-bases act almost like fully atomic
knowledge-bases, the third question can be answered: An attacking
agent needs to at least know the atoms that are needed to encode
the secrets, and it is irrelevant whether the knowledge-base internally
uses a finer granularity.
3.1.1 Semantics
Since propositional logic is well known and discussed in literature,
we give only a brief overview to help adapting to the used notations.
The semantics of propositional logic is given by
PA = (LA, IA, )
as presented below.
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Language/Syntax
Definition 3.1.1
The language of propositional logic LA over a set of propositional
letters A is defined by the following Backus–Naur form:
ψ ::= a |
a∈A
| (¬ψ) | (ψ ∧ ψ)
The length #ψ of a propositional formula is defined to be the number
of logical connectors (¬, ∧) in the formula. 2
To ease notation, brackets will be left away, whenever it is clear
where they should be, e.g. outermost brackets.
Standard Interpretations
Constructing the set of interpretations happens to some extend in
a reverse way of the definition of semantical implication in section
2.2. First it is declared, how a (complete) atomic knowledge-base
semantically implies specific formulae. Afterwards this is general-
ized to gain a definition of the satisfaction relation. Then it nor-
mally proceeds by entailing all other defined uses, like e.g. general
knowledge-bases.
Definition 3.1.2
The set of interpretations for PA is the set of Boolean functions
IA := {f | f : A→ {0, 1}}. 2
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Definition 3.1.3 (Atomic Semantic Implication)
Let (TA,FA) be a partition of A. We will refer to the sets as true
(TA) and false (FA) atoms, respectively.
Atomic semantic implication of a propositional formula ψ ∈ PA by
(TA,FA), in symbols
TA,FA  ψ,
is inductively defined as follows:
• TA,FA  a if a ∈ TA
• TA,FA 6 a if a ∈ FA
• TA,FA  ¬ψ if (TA,FA) 6 ψ
• TA,FA 6 ¬ψ if (TA,FA)  ψ
• TA,FA  ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if (TA,FA)  ψ1 and (TA,FA)  ψ2
• TA,FA 6 ψ1 ∧ ψ2 if (TA,FA) 6 ψ1 or (TA,FA) 6 ψ2 2
Definition 3.1.4 (Propositional Satisfiability)
For any Boolean function f : A→ {0, 1} let
• TA(f) := {a ∈ A | f(a) = 1} and
• FA(f) := {a ∈ A | f(a) = 0}.
Then define
f  ϕ, iff TA(f),FA(f)  ϕ. 2
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Lemma 3.1.5 ( is well defined)
For all formulae ϕ ∈ PA and all interpretations i
either i  ϕ or i 6 ϕ. 2
Proof Straightforward by induction on the length of the formula.
Definition 3.1.6
We extend the notion of satisfiability in the way given by the defini-
tions 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 to semantic implication of sets of formulae and
knowledge-bases. 2
Remark 3.1.7
Obviously, if semantical implication is restricted to sets of atomic
propositional formulae on the left side and a single formula on the
right side, then the semantical implication matches the definition of
atomic semantic implication. 2
3.1.2 Basic Properties
Remark 3.1.8
Since (TA,FA) is a partition of A, we obviously have
(TA,FA) 6 ψ if and only if not (TA,FA)  ψ
for all formulae ψ. We will use the following easy-to-check properties
without explicitly mentioning them:
• (TA,FA)  ψ iff (TA,FA) 6 ¬ψ,
• (TA,FA) 6 ψ iff (TA,FA)  ¬ψ,
• ¬ψ ∈ TS iff ψ ∈ FS ,
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• ψ ∈ TS iff ¬ψ ∈ FS ,
• ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ TS iff ψ1, ψ2 ∈ TS and
• ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ FS iff ψi ∈ FS for at least one i ∈ {1, 2} 2
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of the presented
definitions.
Lemma 3.1.9
Propositional logic is a subboolean, atomic semantics with negation.
The base formulae B = A and operators O = {¬,∧}, where ¬ is a
negation operator. 2
Proof By construction, it is easy to see, that
• b∧(v1, v2) = min(v1, v2) and
• b¬(v) = 1− v
fulfil all requirements. 
3.2 Boolean Description Logic
Often, not only information has to be protected, that can be pressed
into an atomic semantics, but also has structural information. One
commonly used framework to model structural information is de-
scription logic. Since it has also the property of not being atomic
in most of its varieties, it also provides a perfect basis to act as a
running example to show how the censors discussed in chapter 5 an-
swer. Hence, the goal of this section is to remind of the definition
of Boolean ALC and build up a standard situation that can be used
as common example.
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It is also possible to define privacy in the original ALC as an on-
tological setup. Methods following this approach have been studied
for example in [SS09] and [SS07].
3.2.1 Semantics
Language/Syntax
Despite the fact that ALC usually denotes only satisfiability of con-
ceptual knowledge [BCM+03], namely T-Boxes, i.e. sets of subsump-
tion statements, and A-Boxes, i.e. (positive) assertional statements
about individuals, in this work Boolean ALC will mostly be referred
to as ALC to adapt it to the used semantical view.
Definition 3.2.1 (ALC)
Given two disjoint sets of symbols AC (atomic concepts) and AR
(atomic roles), the language of ALC is defined by the following gram-
mar in Backus–Naur form:
ψ ::= ψ ∧ ψ | ¬ψ | C v C
C ::= Ci |
Ci∈AC
| ⊥ | > | C u C | C | ∃R.C | ∀R.C
R ::= Ri |
Ri∈AR
Here Ci ∈ AC are the atomic concepts and Ri ∈ AR are atomic
roles (or role names). The sets R (Roles), C (Concepts) and LALC
(ALC-formulae) are defined as the sets of words that can be de-
rived starting from R, C and ψ respectively. Further we refer to a
set of ALC-formulae as (positive ALC-) knowledge-base and to the
pair (AR,AC ) as its (description) basis. 2
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Interpretations
Definition 3.2.2 (ALC-Interpretation)
Given a description basis (AR,AC ), an (ALC-) interpretation is a
pair (∆I , ·I), consisting of a non-empty domain ∆I and a function
·I : C ∪ R → ℘(∆I) ∪ ℘(∆I ×∆I)
that satisfies the following conditions:
• >I = ∆I , ⊥I = ∅
• for each atomic concept A ∈ AC : AI ⊆ ∆I
• for each atomic role R ∈ AR: RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I
• for each compound concept it inductively holds
– (C uD)I = CI ∩DI
– (C)I = ∆I \ CI
– (∃R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∃b ∈ CI : (a, b) ∈ RI}
– (∀R.C)I = {a ∈ ∆I | ∀b ∈ ∆I : (a, b) ∈ RI → b ∈ CI}2
Definition 3.2.3 (ALC-Satisfiability)
Satisfiability of formulae within an interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) is
defined inductively as follows:
• I  C v D iff CI ⊆ DI
• I  ¬ψ iff not I  ψ (abbreviated by I 6 ψ)
• I  ϕ ∧ ψ iff I  ϕ and I  ψ 2
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Remark 3.2.4
It should be clear now that expressions of the form C v D and
CuD are of two different types. The expression C v D is a formula,
which thus can be true of false; whereas C uD is a concept, which
is interpreted as a set of objects. 2
3.2.2 A Running Example
All censors of chapter 5 can be used to handle knowledge-bases on
ALC. In this section we present a standard situation to provide
examples of how the censors would behave in it. The presented
examples are a mainly a notational variant of the examples presented
in [SW14].
To avoid over-complicating the example, we introduce straight
forward and intuitive variants and short notations: For two concepts
C and D and (ALC-) formulae ψ1, ψ2 ∈ LALC
• C unionsqD abbreviates (C uD),
• C w D abbreviates D v C,
• C ≡ D abbreviates C v D ∧D v C,
• ψ1 → ψ2 abbreviates ¬(ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2), and
• ψ1 ∨ ψ2 abbreviates ¬(¬ψ1 ∧ ¬ψ2).
The semantical meaning of the abbreviations follows exactly the
usual usage of these symbols (equivalence or union of sets, resp.
logical implication or conjunction). Let us point out, that the first
abbreviation is on the level of concepts and all others are short
notations of formulae.
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To start with the example setup, consider the following setting:
A community of six persons (all with drivers licence) shares two cars,
an Opol and a Persche. One day it happens that one of the cars was
photographed in a speeding-trap. The photograph clearly shows the
driver’s hair colour and the car driven.
In order to determine who drove the car through the speed-trap the
policeman calls at the community to inquire. The gardener (a very
loyal employee) answers the phone.
In our terms we have the following situation: Both, CK (the know-
ledge of the gardener) and AK (the knowledge of the inquiring po-
liceman), contain the following information:
• Alice, Bob, Carol, Dave, Eve and Floyd are Persons,
A v Person∧B v Person∧ . . . ∧ F v Person
Here A, B, C, D, E and F are quasi-nominals. A nominal is a
concept that is satisfied by exactly one individual. In ALC we
cannot express that a concept is a nominal but we can tacitly
add information like ¬(A ≡ ⊥) or (A uB) ≡ ⊥, which give us
the desired properties.
• Opol and Persche are Cars and the car in question (TheCar)
is one of them:
O v Car∧P v Car, TheCar ≡ O ∨ TheCar ≡ P
(again, O, P are quasi-nominals)
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• Any Person is either blond, brunette or red-haired:
RedunionsqBlondunionsqBrunette ≡ Person∧ReduBlond ≡ ⊥ ∧ . . .
• The community consists of exactly those persons:
Community ≡ A unionsqB unionsq . . . unionsq F
• The car in question had only one driver, who is from the com-
munity:
∃DriverOf.TheCar ≡ A ∨ . . . ∨ ∃DriverOf.TheCar ≡ F
In addition, the policeman knows the hair colour (HairColor) of
the driver of the car (∃DriverOf.TheCar), that is
∃DriverOf.TheCar v HairColor
where HairColor is exactly one of Blond, Red or Brunette. The
policeman also knows the driven car (TheCar), which is either O or
P . Hence we have
HairColor ≡ Blond∧TheCar ≡ O
or
HairColor ≡ Red∧TheCar ≡ P
or
. . . .
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Note that we have only one of them but not several simultaneously.
We do not fix this knowledge now so that we can discuss several
different settings.
To the knowledge of the gardener we add following:
• He knows the hair colours:
A,B,C v Blond, D,E v Brunette and F v Red
(notice, that e.g. from this and the previously given informa-
tion ReduBlond ≡ ⊥ it follows ¬F v Blond, so the gardener
knows the exact hair colour of community members)
• He has seen Alice, Carol and Floyd go to the carport and heard
them leave by car:
∃DriverOf.TheCar v A unionsq C unionsq F
• If they took the Persche, certainly Floyd was its driver:
TheCar ≡ P → (F ≡ ∃DriverOf.P ∧ (A unionsq C) w ∃DriverOf.O)
(notice, that ∃DriverOf.O v (AunionsqC) does not mean they actu-
ally took the other car, since ∃DriverOf.O) ≡ ⊥ could hold.)
Since the gardener does not want one of the group to be fined, he
must not give the policeman a chance to infer who drove that car.
Hence the secrets are
A ≡ ∃DriverOf.TheCar,
B ≡ ∃DriverOf.TheCar,
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. . . ,
F ≡ ∃DriverOf.TheCar.
So far we do not have a privacy configuration, since CK |= AK
does not hold. However, once the policeman told (prior to start-
ing his inquiries) the gardener that the community’s Persche was
photographed by a speed-camera (i.e. TheCar ≡ P ), and hence the
gardener knows
F ≡ ∃DriverOf.TheCar
this is achieved, since now also the driver’s hair colour (red)
∃DriverOf.TheCar v Red
can be inferred by the gardener.
In order to establish a privacy configuration in the situation where
the Opol was driven, the policeman has to give out both information:
TheCar ≡ O and ∃DriverOf.TheCar v HairColor
We define two query sequences of the policeman to provide ex-
emplary answers of the presented censor-functions:
P1 := (∃DriverOf.TheCar ≡ A,∃DriverOf.TheCar ≡ B,
. . . ,∃DriverOf.TheCar ≡ F, t, t, . . .)
P2 := (∃DriverOf.TheCar v HairColor,
A v HairColor, B v HairColor, . . . , F v HairColor, t, t, . . .)
We keep these queries very simple in order to not increase the com-
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plexity of this already very long example set-up. The first sequence
asks only the hidden secrets, the second only information on the
hair-colours.
In order to qualify our gardener as an answering-function (here,
the privacy configuration is fixed), he needs to be sure about the
knowledge of the policeman. So we assume, he himself has some
experience with photographs taken by speeding-cameras and hence
knows, that only hair-colours and license-plates are visible on them.
To upgrade him to a censor, we would have to make him independent
of the observed situation as well. E.g. he would have to be able
to react even if no one drove or the policeman had less or more
knowledge (as long as all secrets are kept in the start) or even in a
completely different start situation (like no knowledge at all).
Example 3.2.5 (Evaluation Censors)
So equipped, our gardener can choose both “strategies” of example
2.4.7: the revealing and the overprotective censor. However neither
of these is a good choice. The revealing strategy is trivially no choice,
since—so far our assumption—he wants to protect his employers, but
would confirm that Floyd drove the car or imply this, e.g. by ruling
out all others. So with the trivial censor our gardener would answer
(for TheCar ≡ P ):
censorPC ...(P
1) = (f, f, f, f, f, t, t, t, . . .)
censorPC ...(P
2) = (t, t, t, t, t, t, f, t, t, . . .)
In both sequences the policeman has the perpetrator after the sixth
answer.
With the overprotective approach on the other side, he might raise
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the policeman’s suspicion, since the policeman might conclude (on
a meta level) that the gardener must know all details to be able to
copy his knowledge. For example, because the gardener “told him”
(in our view confirmed) the red hair-colour of the driver (again with
TheCar ≡ P ).
censorPC ...(P
1) = (u, u, u, u, u, u, t, t, . . .)
censorPC ...(P
2) = (t, u, u, u, u, u, u, t, t, . . .)
2
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Language Structures
4.1 Handling Negation
In case a semantics possesses a negation, the situation that has to be
This is due to the fact that negative knowledge of a formula can be
replaced by positive knowledge of a negated formula. In this section
we will proof that one can then just use the positive notations of all
defined symbols.
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Definition 4.1.1
Let ψ ∈ L and a ∈ {t, f, u, r}. The (intended) positive content (in a
semantics with negation) of a as answer to ψ is given by
Cont(ψ, a) =

{ψ} if a = t
{¬ψ} if a = f
{♦ψ,♦¬ψ} if a = u
∅ if a = r
(Repeating remark 2.4.12).
Analogously, their negative content is given by
Cont(ψ, a) =

{¬ψ} if a = t
{ψ} if a = f
{ψ,¬ψ} if a = u
∅ if a = r
in the natural way. 2
Definition 4.1.2
Let KK = (T,F) be a knowledge-base.
Then, the knowledge-base given by
KK := (T ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ F}, ∅)
is called positive version of KK and the knowledge-base given by
KK := (∅,F ∪ {¬ψ | ψ ∈ T})
is called negative version of KK. 2
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Lemma 4.1.3
Let KK be a knowledge-base. Then the knowledge-bases KK and KK
satisfy the same interpretations as KK. 2
Proof To show {i ∈ I | i  KK} = {i ∈ I | i  KK}:
In case FKK = ∅ this is trivial.
Otherwise let i  KK. By definition, this means i  TKK and
i co FKK . Hence, for all ψ ∈ FKK it is i 6 ψ.
Therefore, by remark 2.2.15 it follows that i  ¬ψ, resulting in
i  {¬ψ | ψ ∈ F} and hence i  KK.
Let i  KK. Then, clearly we have i  TKK and i  ¬ψ for all
ψ ∈ FKK . Hence, by definition of the negation operator 2.2.14, we
have i 6 ψ.
Therefore, it holds i co FKK , and hence i  KK.
The equivalence {i ∈ I | i  KK} = {i ∈ I | i  KK} fol-
lows analogously. 
The following theorem is now immediate:
Theorem 4.1.4
Let censor be any censor on a semantics with negation. If replacing
• the usual content (defined in 2.4.11) by the positive [negative]
content,
• and accordingly all knowledge-bases by their positive [negative]
versions,
does not change any of the censor’s answers, all quality proper-
ties (i.e. continuous, credible, effective, truthful, minimal invasive,
[atomic] repudiating) of the censor remain unchanged. 2
53
CHAPTER 4. DEPENDENCIES ON LANGUAGE
STRUCTURES
Proof Continuity follows, because it is completely independent
from the knowledge-bases.
For the other properties: If all answers remain unchanged, so do the
sets of interpretations of the state cloud by lemma 4.1.3. Since also
all evaluations remain unchanged, the claim follows. 
4.2 Pseudo-Atomicity and Evaluation
When trying to formalize real situations (e.g. statements in natural
language) as propositional statements, often the following approach
is used. First, more or less independent basic statements are iso-
lated and represented by a propositional letter (atom). Second, the
so separated letters are used to rebuild the original dependencies.
Finally, the thus found formulae form a knowledge-base on which
further reasoning is based.
This approach has several advantages, mainly that it is easy and
straightforward. However, it has the disadvantage that the selection
of the basic statements is usually not unique. Moreover it is not
clear whether dependencies of ignored substatements affect query
evaluation.
In this section we show that the evaluation of known statements
is not affected by unknown substatements. Therefore, the typical
modelling approach is indeed safe. Furthermore, the approach still
works on all sorts of subboolean semantics, as long as their basis-
formulae are atomic.
To provide a formal proof of this fact, we define an alterna-
tive incomplete evaluator, which is based on the knowledge of the
truth-values of some basis-formulae. We will proceed to show that
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this evaluator is immediately usable on atomic knowledge-bases and
then adapt the base sets to identify necessary conditions on basis-
formulae. With this tools, we are able to prove that in presence
of reasonable assumptions, the propositional subformulae of pseudo-
atomic elements do indeed not affect the calculations of truth-values
and furthermore, that these formulae can be safely assumed to be
atomic.
The following lemma can be found in multiple variants in most
introductory textbooks to propositional logic:
Lemma 4.2.1
Every Boolean function b : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be expressed as com-
bination of the two Boolean functions b¬(v) = 1− v (negation) and
b∧(v1, v2) = min(v1, v2) (conjunction).
I.e. for each Boolean function b there is a representation of the func-
tion b′ ∈ B¬,∧n , where the set of Boolean functions of degree n and
∧,¬ combinations B¬,∧n is inductively defined by
• pini ∈ B¬,∧ (i-th projection),
with pii(v1, . . . , vn) = vi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
• if t1, t2 ∈ B¬,∧ then b∧ ◦ (t1, t2) ∈ B¬,∧,
with the pairing (t1, t2) /∈ B¬,∧ being defined by
(t1, t2)(v1, . . . , vn) = (t1(v1, . . . , vn), t1(v1, . . . , vn))
• if t ∈ B¬,∧ then b¬ ◦ t ∈ B¬,∧
(the application order by ◦ is from right to left), and for all tuples
(v1, . . . , vn) ∈ {0, 1}n it holds b(v1, . . . , vn) = b′(v1, . . . , vn). 2
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Notice that the lemma can be read like this: When viewing the el-
ements of B¬,∧ as functions (and not as representations of functions),
the sets {b | b : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}} and B¬,∧ are identical. Choosing
¬ and ∧ as operators has plainly technical reasons. Mainly that it
allows to keep negation (and hence its properties from the previous
section). The operator ∧ was chosen, because it allows to push truth
“inward”, as will be shown below: If a formula ψ1 ∧ ψ2 is true, so
are ψ1 and ψ2. This will be used to reduce evaluation overhead by
storing formulae that are as short as possible in the knowledge-base.
Of course the arguments in this section could be similarly done by
using ∨ (disjunction) and hence pushing falsity inward.
Example 4.2.2
The constant Boolean function
b(v1, . . . , vn) = 1
could be calculated by
b(v1, . . . , vn) = 1−min(1− v1, v1)
and hence could be represented by
b′ = b¬ ◦ b∧ ◦ (b¬ ◦ pi1, pi1)
This representation is obviously not unique. 2
Definition 4.2.3 (Boolean Completion)
Let S = (L, I, ) be a subboolean semantics with base formulae B
and operators O. Then the Boolean completion S? = (L?, I?,? )
is defined as follows:
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• L? is defined by all words derived by ϕ in the Backus–Naur
form
ϕ ::= b |
b∈B
| (¬ϕ) | (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
where ¬, ∧ are new symbols and hence do not appear in L,
• I? := {(T,F) | T ∪F = B and T ∩F = ∅} is the set of binary
partitions of B, and
• (T,F) ? ψ is inductively defined by
– For ψ ∈ B:
ψ ∈ T iff (T,F) ? ψ
– For ψ = ¬ψ′:
(T,F) ? ψ iff (T,F) 6? ψ′
– For ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2:
(T,F) ? ψ iff (T,F) ? ψ1 and (T,F) ? ψ2
In addition, the length #ψ of a L? formula is defined to be the
number of logical connectors (¬, ∧) in the formula. 2
Example 4.2.4
Propositional logic is its own Boolean completion, i.e. PA = P?A 2
Remark 4.2.5
It is worth noticing, that the extension of ? to satisfaction and
co-satisfaction of sets of formulae, defined in 2.2.4, or to knowledge-
bases, defined in 2.2.3, does not cause ambiguity problems. In def-
inition 4.2.3 the pair (T,F) ∈ I? refers to a specific interpretation.
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However, if (T,F) refers to a knowledge-base over S?, the same
formulae are satisfied or co-satisfied. Especially, the semantical im-
plications
• (T,F) ? (T,F)
• (T,F) ? T
• (T,F) ?co F
hold in all defined meanings. 2
Definition 4.2.6 (Boolean Embedding)
Let S = (L, I, ) be a subboolean semantics with base formulae B
and operators O and let S? = (L?, I?,? ) its Boolean completion.
Then the embedding ? : L → L? as defined as follows is called
Boolean embedding.
For each operator o(ψ1, . . . , ψdeg o) ∈ O fix an equivalent repre-
sentation b′o of bo via lemma 4.2.1 consisting of combinations of b¬
and b∧.
The embedding ? : L → L? is inductively defined as follows:
• If ψ ∈ B:
?(ψ) = ψ
• If ψ = o(ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o)):
?(ψ) = I(b′o)
and I is inductively defined as follows:
– I(pi
deg(o)
i ) = ?(ψi)
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– I(b¬ ◦ t) = (¬I(t))
– I(b∧ ◦ (t1, t2)) = (I(t1) ∧ I(t2))
(The function I provides a transformation of the Boolean func-
tions into L? formulae. Obviously, it depends as well on the
subformulae ψ1, . . . , ψdeg(o), which we omitted from the for-
mula’s signature for simplification). 2
Let us point out, that ? is in general not deterministic (and hence
not a function), since there might be several ways to construct a
formula from the base-formulae by means of the operators.
Example 4.2.7
Assume a semantic S with language L = {x, y} with y ∈ TS , the
constant operator o : L → L with
o(x) = o(y) = y
has the constant Boolean function bo = 1, which has the represena-
tiation
b′ = b¬ ◦ b∧ ◦ (b¬ ◦ pi1, pi1)
seen in example 4.2.2. A possible basis is B := {a}.
As translation ?(b) only ?(o(a)) can be used, which is calculated to
be
?(b) = ¬(¬a ∧ a)
2
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Lemma 4.2.8
Let S = (L, I, ) be a subboolean semantics with base formulae B
and operators O, let S? = (L?, I?,? ) its Boolean completion and
let ? be their Boolean embedding.
Then ? is a function, iff all combined formulae ψ ∈ L\B are uniquely
expressible by base formulae and operators.
If additionally S is atomic, then
1. the satisfaction of embedded formulae is independent of the
choice of the operator representations, i.e. for two embeddings
?1 and ?2 and all formulae ψ ∈ L it holds
(T,F) ? ?1(ψ) iff (T,F) ? ?2(ψ),
2. and all formulae ψ ∈ L are semantically implied by an atomic
knowledge-base (T,F) over S iff they are satisfied in the in-
terpretation (T,F) of S?, i.e. for all ψ ∈ L and T,F ⊆ B it
holds
(T,F)  ψ iff (T,F) ? ?(ψ). 2
Proof The first part of the lemma is trivial, since it is just a sub-
stitution of operators.
For the second part it suffices to show claim 2. Claim 1 then follows
by definition of being subboolean (2.2.9) and observing that satis-
faction of the formulae ?(ψ) is only dependent on the satisfaction of
base formulae and the Boolean function. Its representation does not
matter.
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Claim 2 is shown by induction on the structure of L:
• If ψ ∈ B is a base formula:
Assume (T,F)  ψ. Then there are three cases:
– ψ ∈ T:
If (T,F) is not satisfiable, this follows as in the next case.
Otherwise, by atomicity T∩F = ∅ and all interpretations
(T ′,F ′) ∈ I?, with (T ′,F ′) ? (T,F), satisfy T ⊆ T ′
and F ⊆ F ′. Hence ψ = ?(ψ) ∈ T ′ and (T ′,F ′) ? ?(ψ).
– ψ ∈ F:
Then, no interpretation i ∈ I satisfies (T,F), since this
would simultaneously imply i  ψ and i 6 ψ.
However, by atomicity, this implies that there is a base
formula ϕ ∈ T ∩ F. Hence, there is no interpretation
(T ′,F ′) ∈ I?, that satisfies (T ′,F ′) ? (T,F), since
ϕ would have to be an element of both T ′ and F ′, in
violation of (T ′,F ′) being a partition.
– ψ ∈ B \ (T ∪ F):
Then, by atomicity, there is an interpretation i ∈ I, s.t.
i ∈ {j ∈ I | j  T} ∩ {j ∈ I | j co {ψ}}
in violation of the assumption (T,F)  ψ.
The case (T,F) 6 ψ follows analogously.
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• if ψ = o(ψ1, . . . ψdeg(o)):
By induction hypothesis, we have for all 1 ≤ i ≤ deg(o)
(T,F)  ψi iff (T,F) ? ?(ψi).
The claim follows by the definition of being subboolean. 
Remark 4.2.9
It is worth noticing, that in the above lemma 4.2.8, the identity
(T,F)  ψ iff (T,F) ? ?(ψ)
holds indeed for all subsets T,F ⊆ B and hence, (T,F) is not (nec-
essarily) a partitions of B. Thus, on the right side the semantic
implication is by an atomic knowledge-base (of L?) and not (neces-
sarily) by an interpretation (in I?). 2
Definition 4.2.10 ((Pseudo-)Atomic Evaluator)
Let S = (L, I, ) be an atomic semantics with base formulae B and
S? = (L?, I?,? ) be its structured completion. Furthermore, let
TS? denote the tautologies and FS? the unsatisfiables of S? (compare
definition 2.2.7). Furthermore, let T,F ⊆ L? \ (TS? ∪ FS?).
The atomic evaluator evala(T,F) of S? is defined on formulae of
L? by
• If ψ ∈ T ∪ F ∪B ∪ TS? ∪ FS? , then
evala(T,F)(ψ) =

t ψ ∈ T ∪ TS?
f ψ ∈ (F ∪ FS?) \ T
u else (i.e. ψ ∈ B \ (T ∪ F) )
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• Otherwise we make a case distinction on the outermost con-
nective of ψ
– if ψ = ¬ψ′ then
evala(T,F)(ψ) =

t evala(T,F)(ψ
′) = f
f evala(T,F)(ψ
′) = t
u else
– and if ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2, then
evala(T,F)(ψ) =

t iff.
evala(T,F)(ψ1) = t and
evala(T,F)(ψ2) = t
f iff.
evala(T,F)(ψ1) = f or
evala(T,F)(ψ2) = f
u else
2
Lemma 4.2.11
In the situation of definition 4.2.10, the incomplete evaluator (def-
inition 2.3.1) of S? is equivalent to the atomic evaluator of S? for
consistent knowledge-bases. I.e. if (T,F) is a consistent, atomic
knowledge-base on S?, then it holds
evala(T,F)(ψ) = eval(T,F)(ψ)
on all ψ ∈ L?. 2
Proof It is to prove that each formula gets assigned the same truth
value in either case of calculation.
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We proceed by induction on the structure of the formulae.
Base case:
For all atoms a ∈ B: By remark 2.2.11, a 6∈ TS? ∪ FS? . Hence, by
atomicity and consistency of (T,F) this case is obvious.
Induction step:
For simplicity we will only write (TA,FA) for all partitions of B, that
satisfy (TA,FA) ? (T,F).
By atomicity, those are exactly the partitions satisfying T ⊆ TA and
F ⊆ FA.
Case ψ = ¬ψ′.
This case is obvious.
Case ψ := ψ1 ∧ ψ2. We distinguish the following cases:
• Assume eval(T,F)(ψ) = t.
In case ψ ∈ TS? , evala(T,F)(ψ) = t follows immediately.
Otherwise by definition, eval(T,F)(ψ) = t holds if and only if
in all partitions (TA,FA) we have (TA,FA) ? ψ, which means,
by definition of ? , that (TA,FA) ? {ψ1, ψ2}.
Hence eval(T,F)(ψ1) = t and eval(T,F)(ψ2) = t and the case
follows by IH. and the definition of evala(T,F).
• Assume eval(T,F)(ψ) = f .
In case ψ ∈ FS? , evala(T,F)(ψ) = f follows immediately.
Otherwise there is a partition (TA,FA), such that (TA,FA) ? ψ
(therefore ψ /∈ TS?), hence
not (TA,FA) ? ψ1 or not (TA,FA) ? ψ2.
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We assume wlog that not (TA,FA) ? ψ1: By IH. we get
evala(T,F)(ψ1) = f and hence by construction eval
a
(T,F)(ψ) = f .
• Assume eval(T,F)(ψ) = u.
Then there are partitions (TA,FA) ? ψ and (TA′,FA′) 6? ψ,
hence ψ /∈ TS? and ψ /∈ FS? .
Also (at least) one of (TA′,FA′) 6? ψ1 or (TA′,FA′) 6? ψ2 holds.
Assume wlog the first.
Hence eval(T,F)(ψ1) = u and eval(T,F)(ψ2) ∈ {t, u}. By IH.
and construction follows evala(T,F)(ψ) = u
The other directions follow by reversing the arguments. 
Remark 4.2.12
Notice, that there are two critical checks above:
First, that subformulae evaluating to u do not directly affect the
calculation of the total value. Indeed the only direct check on being
unknown is done in the case of base formulae. Second, that we need
to deal with tautologies and unsatisfiables. Especially this check
must be executed prior to the calculation on subformulae, since the
three cases in the build up of the evaluator are not structuredly
distinct. 2
Combining lemmata 4.2.11 and 4.2.8 the following corollary fol-
lows immediately:
Corollary 4.2.13
In the situation of definition 4.2.10, and using the structured embed-
ding ?. It holds for all consistent atomic knowledge-bases (T,F) of
S, that
eval(T,F)(ψ) = eval
a
(T,F) (?(ψ))
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for all ψ ∈ L. (The left evaluation is determined on S, but the right
evaluation on S?.) 2
Lemma 4.2.14
In the situation of definition 4.2.10, let (T,F) be a consistent knowl-
edge-base of S (not necessarily atomic).
Furthermore define a knowledge-base (T ?,F?) by
• T ? := {?(ψ) ∈ L? | ψ ∈ T}
• F? := {?(ψ) ∈ L? | ψ ∈ F}
Then there exist unique subsets
• T a ⊆ {ψ ∈ L? | eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = t} \ TS?and
• Fa ⊆ {ψ ∈ L? | eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = f} \ FS?
that satisfy the following conditions: for all ψ,ψ1, ψ2 ∈ L?
p1) evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = eval(T ?,F?)(ψ),
p2) ¬ψ /∈ T a ∪ Fa
(formulae are free of negation prefixes)
p3) if ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ T a ∪ Fa,
then eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = u and eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2) = u
(all subformulae are unknown).
Moreover, it holds T a ⊆ B. 2
Proof The existence of subsets with the two minimality properties
p2) and p3) is obvious since both just filter out undesired formulae.
To proof the equality of evala(T a,Fa) and eval(T ?,F?) we assume that
evala(T a,Fa) 6= eval(T ?,F?)
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and let ψ ∈ L? be a shortest witness. That is
• evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) 6= eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) and
• evala(T a,Fa)(ψ′) 6= eval(T ?,F?)(ψ′) implies #ψ′ ≥ #ψ.
Obviously, by definitions of TS? , FS? and evala(T a,Fa), it is
ψ /∈ TS? ∪ FS? .
We distinguish all possibilities for eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) depending on the
outermost connective of ψ and show that in all cases
evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = eval(T ?,F?)(ψ)
holds, contradicting our assumptions.
• Assume eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = t.
– If ψ ∈ B: obviously, then ψ ∈ T a and hence, by definition
of the atomic evaluator evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = t.
– If ψ = ¬ψ′: then f = eval(T ?,F?)(ψ′) = evala(T a,Fa)(ψ′),
the first equality by definition of eval(T ?,F?) and the sec-
ond because #ψ′ < #ψ.
Since ψ starts with a negation, it is ψ /∈ T a ∪ Fa.
Hence, since we already ruled out, that ψ is a tautology,
it is evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = t, as a result of the negation calcu-
lation in the definition of evala(T a,Fa).
– If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2: then by definition
eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2)
= evala(T a,Fa)(ψ1)
= evala(T a,Fa)(ψ2) = t.
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It follows, that ψ /∈ T a.
Obviously, we have ψ /∈ Fa as well, since
eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) 6= f
by definition.
Hence the value of evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = t.
• Assume eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = f :
– If ψ ∈ B: as above.
– If ψ = ¬ψ′: as above
– If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2: we distinguish the following cases.
If eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = f or eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2) = f ,
then ψ /∈ Fa, and, by reasoning analogous to above, it is
evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = f .
If eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = t, then eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2) = f , and
hence, the previous case applies.
Analogously for eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2) = t.
If eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = eval(T ?,F?)(ψ2) = u:
Then ψ ∈ Fa and the desired evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = f follows
from the base-case in the definition of the atomic evalua-
tor.
• Assume eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = u:
it immediately follows that neither eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = t nor
eval(T ?,F?)(ψ) = f and hence ψ /∈ T a ∪ Fa.
Again we distinguish:
– If ψ ∈ B, then evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = u is immediate.
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– If ψ = ¬ψ′: This follows exactly as in the above cases.
– If ψ = ψ1 ∧ ψ2: Then at least one of ψ1, ψ2 evaluates
to u as well, wlog. eval(T ?,F?)(ψ1) = u. Also neither
can evaluate to f . Hence since ψ /∈ T a ∪ Fa, we have
evala(T a,Fa)(ψ) = u.
The last claim T a ⊆ B follows by the two properties p2) and p3)
and observing that evala(T a,Fa)(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) = t always implies
evala(T a,Fa)(ψ1) = eval
a
(T a,Fa)(ψ2) = t.
Hence, no compund formula can be in T a. 
Definition 4.2.15
The knowledge-base (T a,Fa) (of S?) found in the previous lemma is
called pseudo-atomic version of the knowledge-base (T,F) (of S). 2
Summing up the presented lemmata in this section, it was proven:
Theorem 4.2.16
Let S = (L, I, ) be an atomic semantics with Boolean completion
S? and structured embedding ?. Furthermore let (T,F) be a consis-
tent S-knowledge-base. Then it holds
eval(T,F)(ψ) = eval
a
(T a,Fa)(?(ψ))
for all formulae ψ ∈ L. 2
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Chapter 5
Generalized Censors
In this chapter, we discuss various censors that work on all general
semantics, as well as restrictions and obstacles that arise from quality
restriction. We start by proving some general properties, that are
handsome tools in proving desired attributes of censors. Starting
with some purely technical tools, as first major consequence will
arise, that truthful censors are always credible. The second major
consequence is, that in the (non-atomic) general semantics an answer
of unknown (u) is strong enough to allow very simple lying censors in
comparison to the censors found in settings of atomic propositional
logic (like [BW08]).
Afterwards we will define and discuss two classes of censors,
namely truthful and cooperative lying censors. Since the later ones
turn out to have all the desired properties, uncooperative lying cen-
sors can not add additional features, and hence there is no need to
discuss them.
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Finally, we use this chapter to show that indeed all of the pre-
sented quality properties are independent. To this end, we will give
examples of censors for each configuration.
5.1 Basic Properties
Lemma 5.1.1 (Quartum non datur)
Let ψ ∈ LALC and let C be a CALC-cloud. Then exactly one of the
following statements holds:
• C |= {ψ}
• C |= {ψ}
• C |= {♦ψ,¬ψ} 2
Proof Trivial. 
Lemma 5.1.2
Let censor be a credible and effective censor, n ∈ N,
• F := {ψ | ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)} and
• T := {ψ | ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)}
for a fixed privacy configuration PC = (CK,AK,SK), then the follow-
ing hold:
a) (T,F) is satisfiable.
b1) eval(T,F)(ψ) ∈ {u, f} for each ψ ∈ TSK
b2) eval(T,F)(ψ) ∈ {u, t} for each ψ ∈ FSK
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c1) eval(T,F)(ψ) = t if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)
c2) eval(T,F)(ψ) = f if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)
d) eval(T,F)(ψ) = u if ♦ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n) (or if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)) 2
Proof Ad a): Since censorPC is credible, there is a cloud-model
(W, ι) of SCPC,q(n). For w ∈ W by definition ι(w) satisfies T and
co-satisfies F.
Ad b): Since {ψ | ψ ∈ T} ∪ {ψ | ψ ∈ F } ⊆ SCPC,q(n) this
follows by definition of effectiveness.
Ad c1): By definition of satisfiability ψ must be semantically implied
by T, hence by definition of eval the statement follows. c2) follows
analogously.
Ad d): By construction of SCPC,q(n) from Cont whenever ♦ψ or ψ
is contained inSCPC,q(n), the other one is included as well. Hence by
credibility, in the cloud-model (W, ι) of SCPC,q(n), there are worlds
w1, w2 ∈ W , such that ι(w1)  ψ and ι(w2)  ¬ψ. As in a) ι(w1)
and ι(w2) are models of (T,F). Hence ψ is neither semantically
implied nor semantically co-implied by (T,F). By definition of eval
follows the proposition. 
5.1.1 Cloud Translation
There is a slightly less intuitive characterisation of truthful censors
via the following translation, which we use to show that every truth-
ful censor is credible:
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Definition 5.1.3 (Cloud-Translation)
Let KK ⊆ L be a knowledge-base. Then the set
ClTr(KK) :=
⋃
ψ∈L
Cont(ψ, evalKK(ψ))
is called (universal) cloud translation of KK. 2
Some facts are immediate:
Proposition 5.1.4 (Properties)
Let KK be an arbitrary knowledge-base, let ψ ∈ L and let C be a
S-cloud. The following statements hold
• If C  ClTr(KK), then C  ψ iff ψ ∈ ClTr(KK)
• If C  ClTr(KK), then C  ψ iff ψ ∈ ClTr(KK)
• If ClTr(KK)  {♦ψ,ψ} and KK is satisfiable,
then ψ /∈ TKK ∪ FKK .
• At least one of the formulae ψ, ψ, ♦ψ or ψ is an element
of ClTr(KK).
• Cont(ψ, evalKK(ψ)) ⊆ ClTr(KK).
• Let
VK := ({η ∈ L | η ∈ ClTr(KK)}, {η ∈ L | η ∈ ClTr(KK)})
then evalKK(ψ) = evalVK(ψ) and
VK =
(
{ψ ∈ L | KK  ψ}, {ψ ∈ L | KK co ψ}
)
. 2
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Lemma 5.1.5 (Cloud-Translation Preserves Satisfiability)
Let KK be a knowledge-base. Then KK is satisfiable iff ClTr(KK)
is satisfiable. 2
Proof Left to right:
Let U := {ψ ∈ L | u = evalKK(ψ)}.
Assume U 6= ∅.
By definition of the evaluation for all ψ ∈ U there are interpretations
iψ and jψ,
such that iψ  (TKK ∪ {ψ},FKK ) and jψ  (TKK ,FKK ∪ {ψ}).
Define C by WC := U × {t, f} and ιC by setting ιC((ψ, t)) := iψ
and ιC((ψ, f)) := jψ. Hence by choice of iψ and jψ the following are
immediate:
• C  ϕ for all ϕ with evalKK(ϕ) = t,
• C  ϕ for all ϕ with evalKK(ϕ) = f ,
• C  ♦ψ for all ψ with evalKK(ψ) = u (ψ ∈ U) and
• C  ψ for all ψ with evalKK(ψ) = u (ψ ∈ U).
Therefore C  ClTr(KK).
If U = ∅ (meaning KK is complete), assume k  KK.
Then we have that C with WC = {w} and ιC(w) := k is a model of
ClTr(KK) as is easily seen.
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Right to left:
Let C be a model of ClTr(KK). By definition
C  {ψ | t = evalKK(ψ)} ∪ {ψ | f = evalKK(ψ)}.
Hence for any w ∈WC it is ιC(w)  KK. 
Lemma 5.1.6 (Truth by Cloud-Translation)
A censor censor is truthful iff for every privacy configuration PC =
(CK,AK,SK), every query sequence q and every n ∈ N0 we have
ClTr(CK)  SCPC,q(n). 2
Proof Left to right:
We show SCPC,q(n) ⊆ ClTr(CK) by induction on n:
Since CK  AK, then, for every ψ ∈ TAK , we have that evalCK(ψ) = t.
Likewise, we have for every ψ ∈ FAK , that evalCK(ψ) = f
Hence
SCPC,q(0) = {ψ | ψ ∈ TAK } ∪ {ψ | ψ ∈ TAK }
=
⋃
ψ∈AK
Cont(ψ, evalCK(ψ)) ⊆ ClTr(CK)
Step: Since censorPC is truthful, an+1 ∈ {r, evalCK(qn+1)}. Thus
either
SCPC,q(n+ 1) = SCPC,q(n) ∪ Cont(qn+1, r) = SCPC,q(n)
and we are done by I.H. or
SCPC,q(n+ 1) = SCPC,q(n) ∪ Cont(qn+1, evalCK(qn+1))
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which follows by I.H. and Cont(qn+1, evalCK(qn+1)) ⊆ ClTr(CK) by
definition of ClTr.
Right to left:
Assume there is an index n, s.t. an 6∈ {r, evalCK(qn)}. Wlog. let this
index be minimal for q. Let C be a cloud model, s.t. C  SCPC,q(n).
Then C 6 Cont(qn, eval(CK, qn)) by Lemma 5.1.1. Hence (in fact) no
model C of SCPC,q(n) satisfies C  ClTr(CK). But By Lemma 5.1.5
there is at least one model of ClTr(CK), since CK is satisfiable by
definition of privacy configuration. We conclude that this model of
ClTr(CK) cannot be a model of SCPC,q(n) and, therefore, ClTr(CK) 6
SCPC,q(n) as required. 
The previous two lemmata combine very nicely:
Corollary 5.1.7
Every truthful censor is credible. 2
5.1.2 Ignorance
In this section we show that a given answer u does not have any
implicational strength when considering general knowledge-bases.
As we show in section 5.3 this turns out to be a valuable tool when
dealing with lying censors: answers that would violate privacy can
simply be replaced by u in order to maintain privacy. However,
even when dealing with truthful censors it is quite helpful since it
also removes the need to check for a possible privacy violation in the
cases where the query directly evaluates to u.
77
CHAPTER 5. GENERALIZED CENSORS
Lemma 5.1.8
Let ϕ, η ∈ L and let censorPC be a censor. Further assume that each
of ♦ϕ, ϕ, and ♦η is consistent with SCPC,q(n). Then if
SCPC,q(n) ∪ Cont(ϕ, u)  η.
it follows SCPC,q(n)  η.
Likewise, if η is consistent with SCPC,q(n), then if
SCPC,q(n) ∪ Cont(ϕ, u)  η,
it follows SCPC,q(n)  η. 2
Proof Since ♦ϕ,ϕ are satisfiable in SCPC,q(n), there are cloud-
models
L  SCPC,q(n) ∪ {♦ϕ} and M  SCPC,q(n) ∪ {ϕ}.
Hence there are worlds l ∈ WL and m ∈ WM with I := ιL(l)  ϕ,
J := ιM(m) co ϕ and for all formulae ρ ∈ L, s.t. ρ ∈ SCPC,q(n), it
holds I  ρ and J  ρ.
Likewise for all formulae ρ ∈ L, s.t. ρ ∈ SCPC,q(n), it holds I co ρ
and J co ρ.
Let C be an arbitrary cloud-model of SCPC,q(n) and w ∈WC. Then
in ιC(w) it either ϕ is satisfied or co-satisfied. Assume ϕ is satisfied:
By adding a fresh world j to WC with ιC(j) = J we obtain a new
model that satisfies SCPC,q(n)∪Cont(ϕ, u), since by construction all
- and -formulae are satisfied and for each ♦-formula there is at
least one world satisfying the corresponding L-formula. Let us point
out, that this is sufficient only because there are no logical connec-
tives that combine cloud-formulae, especially no kind of disjunction
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or negation.
Thus by presumption this model satisfies η. Therefore by defini-
tion η is satisfied in all ι(w) where w ∈WC∪{j}. Hence η is satisfied
in all ι(w) where w ∈WC and hence C  η.
The case, in which ϕ is co-satisfied, follows analogously by adding I.
The second part of the lemma follows similarly. 
Corollary 5.1.9 (Security in Ignorance)
Let censor be a censor. For privacy configuration PC, query-sequence
q ∈ LN and a := censorPCPC(q), let censorPC fulfil the conditions(
CnPC,q
)
,
(
EnPC,q
)
, and
(
E¯nPC,q
)
.
If both ♦qn+1 and qn+1 are satisfiable in SCPC,q(n) then setting
the corresponding answer to an+1 := u leads to satisfaction of the
conditions
(
Cn+1PC,q
)
,
(
En+1PC,q
)
and
(
E
n+1
PC,q
)
. 2
5.1.3 Standard Repudiation Sequences
Basically repudiation is a property that enforces the existence of
alternative, non-harmful knowledge-bases. These knowledge-bases
should act as replacement of the censored knowledge-base and the
censor should reproduce the same answers when equipped with those
alternatives. This way, meta-inference by reverse engineering possi-
ble databases and hence revealing hidden secrets by an attacker is
effectively blocked.
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A good candidate as such a cover-up-sequence of knowledge-bases
turns out to be
AltK(n) := ({ψ | ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)}, {ψ | ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)})
at least for effective censors. The main reason is the following fact:
Proposition 5.1.10
For all n ∈ N and ψ ∈ L, if a censor is effective up to stage n it
holds
SCPC,q(n)  ψ iff AltK(n)  ψ,
and
SCPC,q(n)  ψ iff AltK(n) co ψ. 2
Proof Concerning the first part:
Right to left is trivial.
By effectiveness it exists a model of SCPC,q(n).
Assume AltK(n) 6 ψ.
Let M  SCPC,q(n) and I  AltK(n) with I 6 ψ.
Then the model constructed by N = (WN, ιN) with WN := WM∪{i}
and
ιN(w) =
{
ιM(w) if w ∈WM
I if w = i
is a model of SCPC,q(n). But N 6 ψ.
Concerning the second part: Co-satisfaction is a stronger notion
than satisfiability, since it requires an interpretation to exist.
So if AltK 6co ψ, there are two cases: AltK is not satisfiable or it has
an interpretation I  AltK(n), where I  ψ.
The first case can not happen, because since by effectiveness, there
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is a model M  SCPC,q(n). But for all worlds w ∈ WM of this
model we have for all named interpretations: ιC(w)  AltK.
Hence the second case applies, where the statement follows similar
as the proof of the first part of the lemma. 
Corollary 5.1.11
Let censor be truthful. Then CK  AltK(n) for any privacy configu-
ration PC and all n. 2
Proof Let ψ ∈ TAltK(n) .
By proposition 5.1.10 SCPC,q(n)  ψ. Hence by lemma 5.1.6 it
is ClTr(CK)  ψ. By definition of the cloud translation it follows
ψ ∈ ClTr(CK) and by the same definition CK  ψ.
Similarly follows CK co ψ, when ψ ∈ FAltK(n) .
5.2 Truthful Censors
In this section the censors must be truthful. So they might refuse to
answer every query, meaning in this context assigning r as answer,
but they cannot assign an answer from {t, f, u} that differs from the
actual evaluation.
An interesting point in this setting is the possibility to complete
the separation of effectiveness from repudiation. To this end we will
discuss two truthful censors which are both continuous, effective and
credible, but only one is repudiating. The failure of being repudiat-
ing will also show how a leak of the censor algorithm can present a
way of obtaining secrets.
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Algorithm 1 Calculate RTCensPC(q)
Require: PC = (CK,SK,AK) as privacy configuration
Require: q ∈ LN
1: a = (a1, a2, . . .)← (u, u, . . .)
2: SCPC,q(0)←
⋃
ϕ∈TAK
Cont(ϕ, t) ∪ ⋃
ϕ∈FAK
Cont(ϕ, f)
3: for n← 1 . . .∞ do
4: compliant ← true
5: for σ ∈ TSK do
6: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)  σ
or SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, f)  σ then
7: an ← r
8: compliant ← false
9: end if
10: end for
11: for σ ∈ FSK do
12: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)  σ
or SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, f)  σ then
13: an ← r
14: compliant ← false
15: end if
16: end for
17: if compliant then
18: an ← evalCK(qn)
19: end if
20: SCPC,q(n)← SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, an)
21: end for
22: return a
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Algorithm 2 Calculate TCensPC(q)
Require: PC = (CK,SK,AK) as privacy configuration
Require: q ∈ LN
1: a = (a1, a2, . . .)← (u, u, . . .)
2: SCPC,q(0)
⋃
ϕ∈TAK
Cont(ϕ, t) ∪ ⋃
ϕ∈FAK
Cont(ϕ, f)
3: for n← 1 . . .∞ do
4: compliant ← true
5: p← evalCK(qn)
6: for σ ∈ TSK do
7: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, p)  σ then
8: an ← r
9: compliant ← false
10: end if
11: end for
12: for σ ∈ FSK do
13: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, p)  σ then
14: an ← r
15: compliant ← false
16: end if
17: end for
18: if compliant then
19: an ← p
20: end if
21: SCPC,q(n)← SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, an)
22: end for
23: return a
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Definition 5.2.1 (Truthful Censors)
We denote the censor determined by algorithm 1 as RTCens (re-
pudiating, not minimally invasive truthful censor) and the censor
determined by algorithm 2 as TCens (non repudiating, minimally
invasive truthful censor). 2
The difference between both algorithms is the choice when they
refuse to answer. The censor TCens only refuses if a truthful answer
leads to aSCPC,q(·) in which a secret is violated. The censor RTCens
also refuses when a response of t or f would lead to this violation of
effectiveness. It is immediately clear that RTCens is not minimally
invasive.
At a first glance and having corollary 5.1.9 in mind it appears,
that RTCens should also answer unknown, if that is the evaluated
answer. However this would lead to a censor violating repudiation.
Example 5.2.2 (Non-Repudiation in Truthful Ignorance)
Assume RTCens would answer u, whenever evalCK(qi) = u. In this
case the proofs of continuity, truth, credibility and effectiveness given
in the coming lemmata still work fine (after shifting around some
cases). We give a counter example to show a failure in repudiation:
Assume PC := (CK,AK,SK) with
• CK := (∅, {σ}),
• AK := (∅, ∅) and
• SK := (∅, {σ, ρ}),
with σ, ρ ∈ P{a,b,c,...}.
We ask the query sequence
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q := (σ ∧ ρ, ρ, σ, a ∧ ¬a, a ∧ ¬a, . . .).
As is easily calculated, we get:
evalCK(σ ∧ ρ) = f
evalCK(ρ) = u
evalCK(σ) = f
It is simple to infer the answer given by the modified RTCensPC (with
unknown):
a = (f, u, r, f, . . .)
The violation of repudiation happens after the refusal:
First notice that after the second answer, any knowledge-base (T,F)
that produces the same answers has to semantically co-imply σ ∧ ρ,
but must also not imply or co-imply ρ. Hence there are two options
left for σ: either it evaluates to u (meaning σ ∧ ρ is a consequence
of more complex axioms) or it evaluates to f . Since in the first case
our modified censor would answer u, which it does not (a3 = r),
there is only one option left and this is eval(T,F)(σ) = f . 2
Example 5.2.3 (3.2.2 cont’d)
Let us calculate the answers of both truthful censors in the case
where TheCar ≡ P :
TCens. . .(P1) = (f, f, f, f, r, r, t, t, . . .)
TCens. . .(P2) = (t, t, t, t, t, r, r, t, t, . . .)
The non-repudiating censor refuses to answer on two questions in
both sequences. In P1, since correctly answering f to ∃DriverOf.P ≡
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D, would already imply ∃DriverOf.P ≡ F to be true in any inter-
pretation.
Similarly in the answer to P2.
However, in contrast to example 5.2.2 above, Floyd is still not lost
when the policeman knows the algorithm, since it is clear, that f
would be a safe answer to ∃DriverOf.P ≡ E, as well as ∃DriverOf.P ≡
F . So both cases remain as possible interpretations.
For the repudiating version, we obtain the answers:
RTCens. . .(P1) = (r, r, r, r, r, r, t, t, . . .)
RTCens. . .(P2) = (t, t, t, t, t, r, r, t, t, . . .)
In the first answer, since every answer to true would immediately
yield a secret. And in the second query’s answer, which is the same
answer that TCens gave to P2, by understanding that changing any
of the given r to either f or t would give away one of the community-
members as driver. However, the given answer rules out A,B,C and
D as possible drivers. 2
The continuity of both censors is immediate:
Lemma 5.2.4 (Continuity)
The censors RTCens and TCens are continuous. 2
Proof Clear by inspection of the algorithm: All decisions are based
only on the state-clouds that are constructed in a step before and
the current query. 
Lemma 5.2.5 (Truth)
The censors RTCens and TCens are truthful. 2
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Proof In both algorithms the answer is only modified to r (if at
all). Hence the condition an ∈ {r, evalCK(qn)} is always satisfied. 
The previous lemma in combination with corollary 5.1.7 provides
immediately:
Corollary 5.2.6 (Credibility)
The censors RTCens and TCens are credible. 2
Lemma 5.2.7 (Effectiveness)
The censors RTCens and TCens are effective. 2
Proof Let censorPC ∈ {RTCens,TCens}, PC be a privacy configura-
tion and q be a query sequence. Set a := censorPCPC(q) and assume
that for all m < n the required properties - for all σ ∈ TSK not
SCPC,q(m)  σ and for all σ ∈ FSK not SCPC,q(m)  σ - holds.
We prove that for n this holds as well:
Case evalCK(qn) = u:
For both TCens and RTCens: In case u is selected as answer, effec-
tiveness in stage n is immediate from corollary 5.1.9. Only RTCens
can also refuse in this case. Then it is
SCPC,q(n) = SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ ∅ = SCPC,q(n− 1)
and the property follows by induction hypothesis.
Case evalCK(qn) = t (for both censors):
If the property is violated, there is a σ ∈ TSK , s.t. SCPC,q(n)  σ
or a σ ∈ FSK , s.t. SCPC,q(n)  σ. But, by construction of the
state-cloud, we have
SCPC,q(n) = SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)
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and hence, in case σ ∈ TSK , we haveSCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, t)  σ
in contradiction to the refusal-selection in line 7 in TCens and line 6
in RTCens, respectively. In the other case, σ ∈ FSK , analougously
we have SCPC,q(n − 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)  σ, in contradicting to the
refusal-selection in the corresponding line 13 in TCens and line 12
in RTCens, respectively.
Hence both censors would have refused to answer then leaving
SCPC,q(n) = SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ ∅
and thus fulfilling the property by I.H.
Case evalCK(qn) = f (for both censors): follows analogously. 
Lemma 5.2.8 (Repudiation)
The censor RTCens is repudiating. 2
Proof Let PC = (CK,AK,SK) be a privacy configuration and q be
a query sequence. Set a := RTCensPC(q).
We show that AltK(n) is a possible choice.
Ad R-C)): PCn := (AltK(n),AK,SK) is a privacy configuration:
-PC-A): AltK(n)  AK.
Lines 2 and 20 of algorithm 1 reflect the definition of a state cloud
as given in definition 2.4.13.
Since by this definition it is
SCPC,q(n) ⊇ {ψ | ψ ∈ TAK } ∪ {ψ | ψ ∈ FAK } = SCPC,q(0),
we have TAK ⊆ TAltK(n) and FAK ⊆ FAltK(n) .
-PC-B): AltK(n) are satisfiable as a consequence of credibility.
-PC-C): is obvious, since SK and AK are unchanged.
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Ad R-B): By effectiveness and proposition 5.1.10.
Ad R-A): Let b := RTCens(AltK(n),AK,SK)(q).
To show: For 1 ≤ i ≤ n it is ai = bi.
Observe that
SCPC,q(0) = SCPCn,q(0) =
⋃
ψ∈TAK
Cont(ψ, t) ∪
⋃
ψ∈FAK
Cont(ψ, f)
holds. Assume we have checked that ak = bk for all k < i ≤ n.
Hence for those k (and especially k = i− 1)
SCPC,q(k) = SCPCn,q(k) (?)
Case ai = t:
If SCPC,q(i − 1)  qi, by (?) also SCPCn,q(i − 1)  qi. Hence we
have bi = t.
Else by (?): SCPCn,q(i−1)∪Cont(qi, t) andSCPCn,q(i−1)∪Cont(qi, f)
do not imply any secret (otherwise already ai = r).
Therefore bi := eval(AltK(n), qi) must hold. But qi ∈ AltK(n), since
qi ∈ SCPC,q(n).
Hence, it is eval(AltK(n), qi) = t and thus bi = t.
Case ai = f : analogous.
Case ai = u: By (?) follows:
• SCPCn,q(i− 1) 6 qi and
• SCPCn,q(i− 1) 6 qi.
Also by (?) we obtain
• SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, t) 6 σ and
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• SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, f) 6 σ
for any σ ∈ TSK and
• SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, t) 6 σ and
• SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, f) 6 σ
for any σ ∈ FSK . Hence, with CK  AltK(n) (corollary 5.1.11), it
follows
bi = eval(AltK(n), qi) = u.
Case ai = r: Hence a positive secret (from TSK ) or negative secret
(from FSK ) must have been violated.
If it is a positive secret,
• either SCPC,q(i− 1) ∪ {qi}  σ
• or SCPC,q(i− 1) ∪ {qi}  σ
for a σ ∈ TSK . Hence by (?)
• either SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ {qi}  σ
• or SCPCn,q(i− 1) ∪ {¬qi}  σ.
Hence bi = r.
If a negative secret is violated, this follows analogously. 
Lemma 5.2.9 (Minimally invasive)
The censor TCens is minimally invasive. 2
Proof Let PC be a privacy-configuration, q a query-sequence and
set a := TCensPC(q).
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Assume there is an index i, s.t. ai 6= evalKK(qi). By inspection of
the algorithm, this can only be a consequence of lines 8 or 14 setting
ai = r. Hence either by line 7 there is a secret σ ∈ TSK such that
SCPC,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, evalCK(qi))  σ,
or by line 13 there is a secret σ ∈ FSK such that
SCPC,q(i− 1) ∪ Cont(qi, evalCK(qi))  σ,
in violation of effectiveness. 
Unfortunately, truthful censors have the problem, that either
they have to be more uncooperative than one could hope for, or they
are vulnerable to repudiation attacks that infer knowledge of secrets
even if the state cloud does not semanically imply them. Hence,
it is generally impossible for truthful censors to have all presented
quality properties.
Theorem 5.2.10
A continuous truthful censor satisfies at most two of the properties
effectiveness, minimal invasion and repudiation. 2
Proof Assume censorPC is continuous, truthful, credible, effective
and minimally invasive. We will show that it is not repudiating.
As above, examine the privacy-configuration PC, given by
CK := ({σ}, ∅) , AK := (∅, ∅) and SK := ({σ}, ∅) ,
and the query q := (σ, σ, . . .). We set a := censorPC(q). Obviously
a1 = r must hold, otherwise censorPC either lies or reveals a se-
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cret. Assume a censored knowledge-base RK1 as alternative to CK at
stage 1 and define a′ := censorPCRK1,AK,SK(q).
There are three cases:
• RK1  σ
• RK1 
co
σ
• both RK1 6 σ and RK1 6
co
σ
It suffices to show, that the later two cannot occur.
Assume RK1 
co
σ.
As consequence of being truthful, the first answer must be either
a′1 = f or a
′
1 = r. By the fact SCPC,q(0)∪{σ} 6 σ and minimal
invasion (it is the first given answer!) it follows that a′1 = f and
hence we obtain the contradiction to f = a′1
!
= a1 = r.
Analogously in the third case it follows a′1 = u.
Hence only knowledge-bases that semantically imply σ are possible
alternatives to CK, contradicting repudiation. 
Corollary 5.2.11 (Non-repudiation)
The censor TCens is not repudiating. 2
Corollary 5.2.12
Effectiveness, continuity, credibility and minimal invasion do not
imply repudiation. 2
5.3 Cooperative Lying Censors
Since the refusing approach did turn out to be unsatisfying, we next
want to consider a censor that is capable of lying but not refusing
to answer.
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Formally this means that they are not truthful, but the possible
answers are limited to A = {t, f, u}. Let us point out that one could
adapt all proofs to the full answer set (including r) and require that a
censor in any situation has an answer different from r. Such a censor
is denoted (seemingly) cooperative (compare definition 2.4.22).
In this section we will discuss censors that are minimally invasive,
lying and not refusing.
Definition 5.3.1 (Minimally Invasive Lying Censor)
We denote the censor determined by algorithm 3 as MILCens. 2
Let us remark that the only difference to TCens is the replace-
ment of the refusal in lines 8 and 14 with the answer u.
Example 5.3.2 (3.2.2 cont’d)
Calculating the answers of MILCens in the case where TheCar ≡ P
yields:
MILCens. . .(P1) = (f, f, f, f, u, u, t, t, . . .)
MILCens. . .(P2) = (t, t, t, t, t, u, u, t, t, . . .)
We find that the censor lies to answer on two questions in both
sequences. Unsurprisingly the answers refused by TCens are now set
to u for the same reasons TCens refused them. 2
Lemma 5.3.3 (Continuity)
The censor MILCens is continuous. 2
Proof Clear by inspection of the algorithm: simply notice that the
determination of the answer an in lines 8, 14 and 19 only depends
on SCPC,q(n − 1), which is determined in the prior loop, and the
current query qn. 
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Algorithm 3 Calculate MILCensPC(q)
Require: PC = (CK,SK,AK) as privacy configuration
Require: q ∈ LN
1: a = (a1, a2, . . .)← (u, u, . . .)
2: SCPC,q(0)←
⋃
ϕ∈TAK
Cont(ϕ, t) ∪ ⋃
ϕ∈FAK
Cont(ϕ, f)
3: for n← 1 . . .∞ do
4: compliant ← true
5: p← evalCK(qn)
6: for σ ∈ TSK do
7: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, p)  σ then
8: an ← u
9: compliant ← false
10: end if
11: end for
12: for σ ∈ FSK do
13: if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, p)  σ then
14: an ← u
15: compliant ← false
16: end if
17: end for
18: if compliant then
19: an ← p
20: end if
21: SCPC,q(n)← SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, an)
22: end for
23: return a
94
5.3. COOPERATIVE LYING CENSORS
Proposition 5.3.4
For the state-clouds of the censor MILCens holds: For all security
configurations, query sequences and all n ∈ N0:
if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n), then evalCK(ψ) = t,
if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n), then evalCK(ψ) = f .
Furthermore CK  AltK(n). 2
Proof By construction in the algorithm, if ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n) [or
resp. ψ ∈ SCPC,q(n)] it results from line 2 or from line 5 in com-
bination with line 19. In either case, by the definition of Cont,
evalCK(ψ) = t [evalCK(ψ) = f ] is immediate. 
If n = 0 in the above proposition, thenSCPC,q(n) encodes exactly
the attacker’s knowledge and hence the claim trivially holds by the
conditions on privacy configurations.
Lemma 5.3.5 (Credibility, effectiveness)
The censor MILCens is credible and effective. 2
Proof Let q be a query-sequence, a := censorPC(q) its answer-
sequence and n ∈ N. Assume that for all m < n the required
properties(
CmPC,q
)
SCPC,q(m) is satisfiable(
EmPC,q
)
for all σ ∈ TSK not SCPC,q(m)  σ(
E¯mPC,q
)
for all σ ∈ FSK not SCPC,q(m) 
co
σ
hold. We prove that for n these properties hold as well:
In case SK = ∅, this is immediate, since the censor will only give
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true answers and CK is satisfiable.
Otherwise there are three cases:
First case: Assume evalCK(qn) = t:
There are four sub-cases:
(1) SCPC,q(n − 1)  qn: In this case
(
CnPC,q
)
,
(
EnPC,q
)
and(
E¯nPC,q
)
are immediate.
(2) SCPC,q(n − 1) 6 qn and no secret is violated by the next
state-cloud, i.e. SCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, t) 6 σ for all σ ∈
TSK and SCPC,q(n − 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t) 6 σ for all σ ∈ FSK :
Then an = t is given by the algorithm and
SCPC,q(n) = SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)
is satisfiable, since otherwise in all models (there are none!)
all secrets would be violated. Hence
(
CnPC,q
)
,
(
EnPC,q
)
and(
E¯nPC,q
)
follow.
(3) SCPC,q(n − 1) 6 qn and a secret is violated by the next
state-cloud, i.e. SCPC,q(n − 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t)  σ for a
σ ∈ TSK or SCPC,q(n− 1)∪Cont(qn, t)  σ for a σ ∈ FSK :
Then an = u is returned. If SCPC,q(n) = SCPC,q(n − 1) ∪
Cont(qn, u) would not be satisfiable, then either qn or
qn is semantically implied by SCPC,q(n − 1). The first
being refused by assumption. If qn is semantically im-
plied by SCPC,q(n− 1), then by proposition 5.1.10 AltK(n−
1) co qn and hence by proposition 5.3.4 CK co qn contradict-
ing evalCK(qn) = t. Hence we have
(
CmPC,q
)
and by lemma
5.1.9 follow
(
EnPC,q
)
and
(
E¯nPC,q
)
.
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The case evalCK(qn) = f follows analogous.
The last case evalCK(qn) = u: Obviously an = u is returned. Satis-
faction of the conditions
(
CnPC,q
)
,
(
EnPC,q
)
and
(
E¯nPC,q
)
follows as in
sub-case (3) above. 
Lemma 5.3.6 (Minimally invasive and lying)
The censor MILCens is minimally invasive and lying. 2
Proof Ad “minimally invasive”:
Assume a = MILCensPC(q) and an 6= evalCK(qn). Then an was set
in line 8 or 14. By the corresponding security check in line 7 or 13
effectiveness would have been violated else.
Ad “lying”:
We give a privacy configuration, a sequence of questions and an
index such that the censor will lie:
CK := ({σ}, ∅), AK := (∅, ∅), SK := ({σ}, ∅) and q = (σ, σ, . . .)
will produce a := (u, u, . . .), but a1 = u 6∈ {r, t = evalCK(q1)}. 
Lemma 5.3.7 (Repudiation)
The censor MILCens is repudiating. 2
Proof Let q be a fixed question series and a = MILCens(q).
We show, that AltK(n) is a possible choice of alternate databases:
From lemma 5.3.5 (effectiveness) and since
{ϕ | ϕ ∈ TAltK(n) } ∪ {ϕ | ϕ ∈ FAltK(n) } ⊆ SCPC,q(n)
it follows that no secret is valid in AltK(n), hence property R-B).
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Ad R-A)): observe that each query qi, where i ≤ n, exactly one of
the following holds:
• qi ∈ TAltK(n) iff AltK(n)  qi iff ai = t
• qi ∈ FAltK(n) iff AltK(n) 
co
qi iff ai = f
• qi /∈ TAltK(n) ∪ FAltK(n) iff AltK(n) 6 qi and AltK(n) 6
co
qi
iff ai = u
This is immediate by credibility and construction.
Hence for all i ≤ n eval(AltK(n), qi) = ai.
Furthermore the security conditions from lines 7 and 13 of the al-
gorithm are never satisfied, since otherwise by proposition 5.1.10
AltK(n) would violate this condition opposing lemma 5.3.5 (as above).
Therefore all questions qi, i ≤ n, are answered by ai and hence prop-
erty R-A) follows.
Ad R-C)): Since satisfiability of AltK(n) was shown (PC-B)) and nei-
ther AK nor SK were changed (PC-C)), it remains to show
that AltK(n)  AK (PC-A)). This is immediate, since
SCPC,q(n) ⊇ {ψ | ψ ∈ TAK } ∪ {ψ | ψ ∈ FAK }
by construction. Therefore AK ⊆ AltK(n) and hence the proof. 
Example 5.3.8
Despite the last lemma, the censor is not atomic repudiating.
Here we consider propositional logic over A := {a, b, c, . . .}.
Let PC = (CK,AK,SK) be given by
• CK := (∅, {a})
98
5.3. COOPERATIVE LYING CENSORS
• AK := (∅, {a ∧ b})
• SK := (∅, {a})
Consider the query-sequence q = (b, b, . . .) The censor MILCens
would give the following answers
MILCensPC(q = (u, u, . . .)
There are only two options that an atomic knowledge-base could
cause the censor to answer u: The value is actually u, which implies,
that the value of a is known to be f—violating a secret—, or b’s value
is t, which implies exactly the same. 2
To finish the section, we give a non-effective (and thus also not
minimally invasive) but credible censor, that satisfies repudiation.
This will prove that repudiation does not imply effectiveness.
Definition 5.3.9 (Ineffective repudiating censor)
We denote the censor determined by algorithm 4 as IeRLCens. 2
Lemma 5.3.10
The censor IeRLCens is credible. 2
Proof Observe that only the last else-clause in line 16 in the algo-
rithm can lead to a not satisfiable SCPC,q(n) in line 19: when the
algorithm answers within the first two checks the class of models of
SCPC,q(n − 1) and SCPC,q(n) remains the same. In the next four
checks the desired satisfiability of the resulting SCPC,q(n) is an ex-
plicit condition.
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Algorithm 4 Calculate IeRLCensPC(q)
Require: PC = (CK,SK,AK) as privacy configuration
Require: q ∈ LN
1: a = (a1, a2, . . .)← (u, u, . . .)
2: SCPC,q(0)←
⋃
ϕ∈TAK
Cont(ϕ, t) ∪ ⋃
ϕ∈FAK
Cont(ϕ, f)
3: for n← 1 . . .∞ do
4: if SCPC,q(n− 1)  Cont(qn, t) then
5: an ← t
6: else if SCPC,q(n− 1)  Cont(qn, f) then
7: an ← f
8: else if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t) is satisfiable
and SCPC,q(n− 1)∪Cont(qn, t)  σ for a σ ∈ TSK then
9: an ← t
10: else if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, f) is satisfiable
and SCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, f)  σ for a σ ∈ TSK then
11: an ← f
12: else if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, t) is satisfiable
and SCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, t)  σ for a σ ∈ FSK then
13: an ← t
14: else if SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, f) is satisfiable
and SCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, f)  σ for a σ ∈ FSK then
15: an ← f
16: else
17: an ← u
18: end if
19: SCPC,q(n)← SCPC,q(n− 1) ∪ Cont(qn, an)
20: end for
21: return a
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Concerning the last step, it follows from the first two steps, that both
SCPC,q(n−1)∪{♦qn} andSCPC,q(n−1)∪{♦¬qn}must be satisfiable.
Hence by corollary 5.1.9 we conclude thatSCPC,q(n−1)∪Cont(qn, u)
is satisfiable. 
Lemma 5.3.11
The censor IeRLCens is not effective. 2
Proof Consider the privacy configuration PC given by
CK := AK := (∅, ∅) and SK := ({σ}, ∅).
In this case the query sequence (σ, σ, . . .) yields (t, t, . . .) and hence
leads to the privacy violation SCPC,q(1)  σ. 
As a matter of fact, the discussed censor is massively ineffective.
It will imply or even confirm a secret whenever it gets a chance
without risking its credibility. An option to become “even more”
ineffective would be to narrow into a secret, e.g. if a sub-query would
be (. . . , ψ1∧· · ·∧ψn → σ, ψ1, . . . ψn . . .) the censor should answer t to
ψ1 to ψn (if possible), which is not necessarily done by the presented
censor. But this would involve a structured analysis of the queried
formulae, a feature that we -so far- do not want to equip our censors
with. Additionally continuity would have to be dropped.
Lemma 5.3.12 (Repudiation)
The censor IeRLCens is repudiating. 2
Proof Let PC = (CK,AK,SK) be a privacy configuration and q be
a query-sequence. By construction of the algorithm it is clear that
the given answers only depend on AK and not -by any means- on
the actual database.
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Hence RKi := AK is a possible choice as such a sequence.
As remarked, R-A) is immediate.
For R-B) notice, that –by definition of PC– AK does not validate any
secret.
From AK  AK also follows, that (AK,AK,SK) is indeed a privacy-
configuration and hence R-C), which completes the proof. 
Let us remark, that the presented censor is only interesting as an
example to separate effectiveness and repudiation. A somehow rea-
sonable censor should at least release sometimes “new” information
(i.e. not known by the attacker yet) from the protected knowledge-
base. In the above setting, the attacker only can learn the potential
secrets in case it did not know them already. The censor is also
extremely far from being minimally invasive.
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Conclusion
In this thesis we presented high quality censors against a singular
attacker that achieve the presented privacy goals. For this purpose
we established two levels of quality properties:
On a first level we formalized quality properties that are based
on the belief presented by the censor, namely
credibility: the presented view is always consistent
effectiveness: all hidden secrets are not directly inferable from the
presented view
On a second level, we discussed properties restricting the censor
based on its answer selection methodology:
continuity: answer selection only depends on previously given an-
swers
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Truthful/Lying: whether the censor is restricted to true state-
ments, or is allowed to lie
Cooperation a censor should always give an answer that matches
the possible evaluation of a query (forcing a censor to lie)
Minimal Invasion: the censor should only distort an answer when
answering the actual evaluation violates either credibility or
effectiveness
Repudiation there should always be a database that does not vi-
olate any secret, but protected by the same censor would pro-
duce the exactly same answers
It was shown, that it is impossible for a truthful censor to have
simultaneously all such properties. However, maximal truthful cen-
sors were presented:
RTCens being credible, effective, continuous and repudiating, but
not minimal invasive
TCens being credible, effective, continuous and minimal invasive,
but not repudiating
On the other hand, lying censors turned out to be optimal in
that respect. Indeed they can have all desired properties. To this
end, the—in this respect—best censor was constructed:
MILCens being credible, effective, continuous, minimal invasive and
repudiating
All of them are however restricted to so called privacy configu-
rations, that is start-situations in which the censor has access to the
104
full pre-knowledge of the attacker and the attacker does not know
any secret at the start.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
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